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I social psychology, Social emotions are emotions that require the representation of the mental states of other people. Examples are embarrassment, guilt, shame, and pride. In contrast, basic emotions such as happiness and sadness only require the awareness of one's own somatic state. Therefore, the development of social emotions is tightly linked with the development of social cognition, the ability to imagine other people's mental states, which generally develops in adolescence. Studies have found that children as young as 2 to 3 years of age can express emotions resembling guilt and remorse. However, while five-year-old children are able to imagine situations in which basic emotions would be felt, but not social emotions, the ability to describe situations in which social emotions might be experienced does not appear until seven years of age.
People may not only share emotions with others, but may also experience similar physiological arousal to others if they feel a sense of social connectedness to the other person. A laboratory-based study by Cwir, Car, Walton, and Spencer (2011) showed that when a participant felt a sense of social connectedness to a stranger (research confederate), the participant experienced similar emotional states and physiological responses to that of the stranger while observing the stranger perform a stressful task.
Social emotions are sometimes called moral emotions, because they play an important role in Morality and moral decision making. In Neuroeconomics, the role social emotions play in game theory and economic decision making is just starting to be investigated.
After functional imaging (fMRI in particular) became popular roughly a decade ago, researchers have begun to study economic decision making with this new technology. This allows researchers to investigate, on a neurological level, the role emotions play in decision making.
The ability to describe situations in which a social emotion will be experienced emerges at around age 7  and, by adolescence, the experience of social emotion permeates everyday social exchange. Studies using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have found that different brain regions are involved in different age groups when performing social-cognitive and social-emotional tasks. While brain areas such as medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), temporal poles (TP) and precuneus bordering with posterior cingulate cortex are activated in both adults and adolescents when they reason about intentionality of others, the medial PFC is more activated in adolescents and the right STS more in adults. Similar age effects were found with younger participants, such that, when participants perform tasks that involve theory of mind, increase in age is correlated with an increase in activation in the dorsal part of the MPFC and a decrease in the activity in the ventral part of the MPFC were observed.
Studies that compare adults with adolescents in their processings of basic and social emotions also suggest developmental shifts in brain areas being involved. Comparing with adolescents, the left temporal pole has a stronger activity in adults when they read stories that elicit social emotions. The temporal poles are thought to store abstract social knowledge. This suggests that adult might use social semantic knowledge more often when thinking about social-emotional situations than adolescents.
- Main article: Neuroeconomics
To investigate the function of social emotions in economic behaviors, researchers are interested in the differences in brain regions involved when participants are playing with, or think that they are playing with, another person as opposed to a computer. A study with fMRI found that, for participants who tend to cooperate on two-person “trust and reciprocity” games, believing that they are playing with another participant activated the prefrontal cortex, while believing that they are playing with a computer did not. This difference was not seen with players who tend not to cooperate. The authors interpret this difference as theory of minds that cooperators employ to anticipate the opponents' strategies. This is an example of the way social decision making differs from other forms of decision making.
In behavioral economics, a heavy criticism is that people do not always act in a fully rational way, as many economic models assume. For example, in the ultimatum game, two players are asked to divide a certain amount of money, say x. One player, called the proposer, decides ratio by which the money gets divided. The other player, called the responder, decides whether or not to accept this offer. If the responder accepts the offer, say, y amount of money, then the proposer gets x-y amount and the responder gets y. But if the responder refuses to accept the offer, both players get nothing. This game is widely studied in behavioral economics. According to the rational agent model, the most rational way for the proposer to act is to make y as small as possible, and the most rational way for the responder to act is to accept the offer, since little amount of money is better than no money. However, what these experiments tend to find is that the proposers tend to offer 40% of x, and offers bellow 20% would get rejected by the responders. Using fMRI scans, researchers found that social emotions elicit by the offers may play a role in explaining the result. When offers are unfair as oppose to fair, three regions of the brain are active: the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the insula. The insula is an area active in registering body discomfort. It is activated when people feel, among other things, social exclusion. The authors interpret activity in the insula as the aversive reaction one feels when faced with unfairness, activity in the DLPFC as processing the future reward from keeping the money, and the ACC is an arbiter that weighs these two conflicting inputs to make a decision. Whether or not the offer gets rejected can be predicted (with a correlation of 0.45) by the level of the responder's insula activity.
Neuroeconomics and social emotions are also tightly linked in the study of punishment. Research using PET scan has found that, when players punish other players, activity in the nucleus accumbens (part of the striatum), a region known for processing rewards derived from actions  gets activated. It shows that we not only feel hurtful when we become victims of unfairness, but we also find it psychologically rewarding to punish the wrongdoer, even at a cost to our own utility.
Some social emotions are also referred to as moral emotions because of the fundamental role they play in morality. For example, guilt is the discomfort and regret one feels over one's wrongdoing. It is a social emotion, because it requires the perception that another person is being hurt by this act; and it also has implication in morality, such that the guilty actor, in virtue of feeling distressed and guilty, accepts responsibility for the wrongdoing, which might cause desire to make amends or punish the self.
Not all social emotions are moral emotions. Pride, for instance, is a social emotion which involves the perceived admiration of other people, but research on the role it plays in moral behaviors yields problematic results.
Empathy is defined by Eisenberg and colleagues as an affective response that stems from the apprehension or comprehension of another's emotional state or condition and is similar to what the other person is feeling or would be expected to feel. Guilt, which is a social emotion with strong moral implication, is also strongly correlated with empathic responsiveness; whereas shame, an emotion with less moral flavor, is negatively correlated with empathic responsiveness, when controlling for guilt.
Perceived controllability also plays an important role modulating people's socio-emotional reactions and empathic responses. For example, participants who are asked to evaluate other people's academic performances are more likely to assign punishments when the low performance is interpreted as low-effort, as oppose to low-ability. Stigmas also elicit more empathic response when they are perceived as uncontrollable (i.e. having a biological origin, such as having certain disease), as opposed to controllable (i.e. having a behavioral origin, such as obesity).
- ↑ Bernett, Stephanie, Geoffrey Bird, Jorge Moll, Chris Frith, and Sarah-Jayne Blakemore (September 2009). Development during Adolescence of the Neural Processing of Social Emotion. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 21 (9).
- ↑ Inhelder, B., & Piaget, J. (1958). The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence. New York, USA: Basic Books.
- ↑ Wainryb, C., Shaw, L. A., & Maianu, C. (1998). Tolerance and intolerance: Children's and adolescents' judgments of dissenting beliefs, speech, persons, and conduct. Child Development, 69(6), 1541−1555.
- ↑ Zahn-Waxler C, Robinson J. 1995. Empathy and guilt: early origins of feelings of responsibility. In Self-Conscious Emotions ed. JP Tangney, KW Fischer, pp. 143–73. New York: Guilford
- ↑ Stipek, Deborah J, J. Heidi Gralinski, and Claire B. Kopp (Nov 1990). Self-concept development in the toddler years. Developmental Psychology 26 (6): 972–977.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Harris, P.L, Olthof, K., Terwogt, M. M., & Hardman, C. C. (September 1987). Children's Knowledge of the Situations that Provoke Emotion. International Journal of Behavioral Development 10 (3): 319–343.
- ↑ Cwir, D., Carr, P. B., Walton, G. M., & Spencer, S. J. (2011). Your heart makes my heart move: Cues of social connectedness cause shared emotions and physiological states among strangers.. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 47 (3): 661–664.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 Eisenberg, Nancy (February 2000). Emotions, Regulations and Moral Development. Annual Review of Psychology 51: 665–697.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 Sanfey, A. G., James K. Rilling1,Jessica A. Aronson, Leigh E. Nystrom1, and Jonathan D. Cohen (13 June 2003). The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game. Science 300 (5626): 1755–1758.
- ↑ Zeman, J., Cassano, M., Perry-Parrish, C., & Stegall, S. (2006). Emotion regulation in children and adolescents. Journal of Developmental & Behavioral Pediatrics, 27, 155–168.
- ↑ Elkind, David, Bowen, Robert (1 January 1979). Imaginary audience behavior in children and adolescents.. Developmental Psychology 15 (1): 38–44.
- ↑ Blakemore, S.-J., den Ouden, H., Choudhury, S., Frith, C. (1 June 2007). Adolescent development of the neural circuitry for thinking about intentions. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 2 (2): 130–139.
- ↑ MORIGUCHI, YOSHIYA, OHNISHI, TAKASHI, MORI, TAKEYUKI, MATSUDA, HIROSHI, KOMAKI, GEN (1 August 2007). Changes of brain activity in the neural substrates for theory of mind during childhood and adolescence. Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 61 (4): 355–363.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 Burnett, S, Bird, G, Moll, J, Frith, C, Blakemore, SJ (2009 Sep). Development during adolescence of the neural processing of social emotion.. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 21 (9): 1736–50.
- ↑ Frith, C. D (29 April 2007). The social brain?. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 362 (1480): 671–678.
- ↑ Zahn, R., Moll, J., Krueger, F., Huey, E. D., Garrido, G., Grafman, J. (10 April 2007). Social concepts are represented in the superior anterior temporal cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (15): 6430–6435.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 McCabe, K. (NaN undefined NaN). A functional imaging study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 98 (20): 11832–11835.
- ↑ Kahneman, Daniel (Dec. 2003). Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics. The American Economic Review 93 (5): 1449–1475.
- ↑ Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (Winter 1991). Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1): 193–206.
- ↑ Ellsberg, Daniel (Nov. 1961). Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75 (4): 643–669.
- ↑ Camerer, Colin F. (2003). Behavioral game theory experiments in strategic interaction, New York [u.a.]: Russell Sage [u.a.].
- ↑ Eisenberger, N. I. (10 October 2003). Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion. Science 302 (5643): 290–292.
- ↑ O'Doherty, J. (16 April 2004). Dissociable Roles of Ventral and Dorsal Striatum in Instrumental Conditioning. Science 304 (5669): 452–454.
- ↑ de Quervain, D. J.-F. (27 August 2004). The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment. Science 305 (5688): 1254–1258.
- ↑ Ferguson TJ, Stegge H. 1998. Measuring guilt in children: a rose by any other name still has thorns. In Guilt and Children, ed. J Bybee, pp. 19–74. San Diego: Academic
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 Tangney, June P. (1 January 1991). Moral affect: The good, the bad, and the ugly.. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61 (4): 598–607.
- ↑ Eisenberg, Nancy, Fabes, Richard A., Murphy, Bridget, Karbon, Mariss, et al, (1 January 1994). The relations of emotionality and regulation to dispositional and situational empathy-related responding.. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 66 (4): 776–797.
- ↑ Weiner, Bernard (2006). Social motivation, justice, and the moral emotions : an attributional approach, Mahwah, NJ [u.a.]: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- ↑ Weiner, Bernard (1 January 1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion.. Psychological Review 92 (4): 548–573.
- ↑ Weiner, Bernard, Perry, Raymond P., Magnusson, Jamie (1 January 1988). An attributional analysis of reactions to stigmas.. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 55 (5): 738–748.
- Economics and psychology a promising new cross-disciplinary field. Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. 2007. ISBN 978-0-262-06263-3.http://econpapers.repec.org/bookchap/mtptitles/0262062631.htm
- Emotional, Regulation, and Moral Development. Nancy Eisenberg.http://psych.colorado.edu/~tito/sp03/7536/Eisenberg_2000.pdf
- Weiner, Bernard (2006). Social motivation, justice, and the moral emotions : an attributional approach. Mahwah, NJ [u.a.]: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ISBN 0-8058-5526-2.
|Acceptance • Affection • Ambivalence • Anger • Angst • Anticipation • Antipathy • Anxiety • Apathy • Bitterness • Boredom • Calmness • Compersion • Contempt • Confusion • Depression • Disappointment • Disgust • Doubt • Ecstasy • Embarrassment • Emptiness • Enmity • Ennui • Enthusiasm • Envy • Epiphany • Fanaticism • Fear • Frustration • Gratification • Gratitude • Grief • Guilt • Happiness • Hate • Homesickness • Hope • Horror • Humiliation • Jealousy • Limerence • Loneliness • Love • Lust • Melancholia • Panic • Pity • Pride • Regret • Rejection • Remorse • Repentance • Righteous indignation • Self-pity • Serenity • Shame • Shyness • Suffering • Surprise|
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