m (correcting format) |
m (link) |
||
| (11 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown) | |||
| Line 4: | Line 4: | ||
Some subset of these elements form individual minds: the subset of just the experiences that you have for the day, which are accordingly just so many neutral elements that follow upon one another, is your mind as it exists for that day. If instead you described the elements that would constistute the sensory experience of rock by the path, then those elements constitute that rock. They do so even if no one observes the rock. The neutral elements exist, and our minds are constituted by some subset of them, and that subset can also be seen to constitute a set of empirical observations of the objects in the world. All of this, however, is just a matter of grouping the neutral elements in one way or another, according to a physical or a psychological (mental) perspective. |
Some subset of these elements form individual minds: the subset of just the experiences that you have for the day, which are accordingly just so many neutral elements that follow upon one another, is your mind as it exists for that day. If instead you described the elements that would constistute the sensory experience of rock by the path, then those elements constitute that rock. They do so even if no one observes the rock. The neutral elements exist, and our minds are constituted by some subset of them, and that subset can also be seen to constitute a set of empirical observations of the objects in the world. All of this, however, is just a matter of grouping the neutral elements in one way or another, according to a physical or a psychological (mental) perspective. |
||
| − | + | This position is credited to [[Ernst Mach]] and [[William James]]. James propounded it in his essay "Does [[Consciousness]] Exist?" in 1904 (reprinted in ''Essays in Radical [[Empiricism]]'' in 1912).<ref>William James, ''Essays in Radical Empiricism, New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912.</ref> [[Bertrand Russell]] later adopted this position.<ref>Bertrand Russell, ''The Analysis of Mind'', London, G. Allen & Unwin; New York, Macmillan, 1921.</ref> |
|
In strict parlance, neutral monism should be distinguished from [[Dual-aspect monism|dual-aspect monism]], which holds that all |
In strict parlance, neutral monism should be distinguished from [[Dual-aspect monism|dual-aspect monism]], which holds that all |
||
| − | [[existence]] consists of one kind (hence [[monism]]) of primal substance, which in itself is neither [[mental]] nor physical, but is capable of mental and physical [[ |
+ | [[existence]] consists of one kind (hence [[monism]]) of primal substance, which in itself is neither [[mental]] nor physical, but is capable of mental and physical aspects or [[attribute]]s that are two faces of the same underlying reality in the one substance. Dual-aspect monism was introduced by the famous [[17th century]] [[Netherlands|Dutch]] philosopher [[Benedictus de Spinoza|Benedict de Spinoza]]. |
| + | [[Emergent materialism]] is a materialist form of metaphysical [[monism]] that respects both mind and [[matter]]. Yet another position is the "[[anomalous monism]]" of the American philosopher [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] ("anomalous" here meaning "not-law-governed" rather than "strange"), which makes the physical ontologically primary and so is opposed to neutral monism and dual-aspect monism, and which holds that the mind cannot be studied scientifically, in opposition to emergent materialism as usually formulated. |
||
| − | [[Emergent materialism]] is another form of metaphysical [[monism]] that respects both mind and [[matter]]. |
||
==See also== |
==See also== |
||
* [[Philosophy of mind]] |
* [[Philosophy of mind]] |
||
* [[Dual-aspect monism]] |
* [[Dual-aspect monism]] |
||
| − | * [[Dialectical monism]] |
||
| − | |||
==Notes and citations== |
==Notes and citations== |
||
| Line 26: | Line 24: | ||
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry] |
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry] |
||
| − | |||
| − | [[Category:Monism]] |
||
[[Category:Philosophy of mind]] |
[[Category:Philosophy of mind]] |
||
| − | [[de:Neutraler Monismus]] |
||
{{enWP|Neutral monism}} |
{{enWP|Neutral monism}} |
||
Latest revision as of 19:40, 28 October 2008
Assessment |
Biopsychology |
Comparative |
Cognitive |
Developmental |
Language |
Individual differences |
Personality |
Philosophy |
Social |
Methods |
Statistics |
Clinical |
Educational |
Industrial |
Professional items |
World psychology |
Philosophy Index: Aesthetics · Epistemology · Ethics · Logic · Metaphysics · Consciousness · Philosophy of Language · Philosophy of Mind · Philosophy of Science · Social and Political philosophy · Philosophies · Philosophers · List of lists
Neutral monism, in philosophy, is the metaphysical view that the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the very same elements, which are themselves "neutral," that is, neither physical or mental. This view denies that the mental and the physical are two fundamentally different things. Rather, neutral monism claims the universe consists of only one kind of stuff, in the form of neutral elements that are in themselves neither mental nor physical. These neutral elements are like sensory experiences: they might have the properties of color and shape, just as we experience those properties. But these shaped and colored elements do not exist in a mind (considered as a substantial entity, whether dualistically or physicalistically); they exist on their own.
Some subset of these elements form individual minds: the subset of just the experiences that you have for the day, which are accordingly just so many neutral elements that follow upon one another, is your mind as it exists for that day. If instead you described the elements that would constistute the sensory experience of rock by the path, then those elements constitute that rock. They do so even if no one observes the rock. The neutral elements exist, and our minds are constituted by some subset of them, and that subset can also be seen to constitute a set of empirical observations of the objects in the world. All of this, however, is just a matter of grouping the neutral elements in one way or another, according to a physical or a psychological (mental) perspective.
This position is credited to Ernst Mach and William James. James propounded it in his essay "Does Consciousness Exist?" in 1904 (reprinted in Essays in Radical Empiricism in 1912).[1] Bertrand Russell later adopted this position.[2]
In strict parlance, neutral monism should be distinguished from dual-aspect monism, which holds that all existence consists of one kind (hence monism) of primal substance, which in itself is neither mental nor physical, but is capable of mental and physical aspects or attributes that are two faces of the same underlying reality in the one substance. Dual-aspect monism was introduced by the famous 17th century Dutch philosopher Benedict de Spinoza.
Emergent materialism is a materialist form of metaphysical monism that respects both mind and matter. Yet another position is the "anomalous monism" of the American philosopher Donald Davidson ("anomalous" here meaning "not-law-governed" rather than "strange"), which makes the physical ontologically primary and so is opposed to neutral monism and dual-aspect monism, and which holds that the mind cannot be studied scientifically, in opposition to emergent materialism as usually formulated.
See also
Notes and citations
External links
| This page uses Creative Commons Licensed content from Wikipedia (view authors). |