Mind-body problem
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The mind-body problem is the view that "mental" phenomena are, in some respects, "non-physical" (distinct from the body). The mind-body dichotomy is the starting point of Dualism, and became conceptualized in the form is currently known in the Western world in René Descartes's philosophy, but also appeared in pre-Aristotelian concepts.[1]
This view of reality leads to consider the corporeal as little valued[1] and trivial. The rejection of the mind-body dichotomy is found in French Structuralism, and is a position that generally characterized post-war French philosophy.[2] The absence of an empirically identifiable meeting point between the non-physical mind and its physical extension has proven problematic to dualism and many modern philosophers of mind maintain that the mind is not something separate from the body.[3] These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, particularly in the fields of sociobiology, computer science, evolutionary psychology and the various neurosciences.[4][5][6][7]
The mind-body problem, to put it as generically and broadly as possible, is this question: "What is the basic relationship between the mental and the physical?" For the sake of simplicity, we can state the problem in terms of mental and physical events. It could just as well be put in terms of processes, or of consciousness. So the problem restated is: "What is the basic relationship between mental events and physical events?"
There are, then, three basic views: mental and physical events are totally different, and cannot be reduced to each other (dualism); mental events are to be reduced to physical events (materialism); and physical events are to be reduced to mental events (phenomenalism). To put it in terms of what exists "ultimately", we could say that according to dualism, both mental and physical events exist ultimately; according to materialism, only physical events exist ultimately; and according to phenomenalism, only mental events exist ultimately. Materialism and phenomenalism are both varieties of monism, and of monism there is one further variety, namely neutral monism.
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[edit] Dualism
Dualism is the idea that the mental and the physical are two completely different kinds of things.
Within Western Philosophy, the first major proponent of Dualism was Plato, who put forward a concept that has come to be known as Platonic idealism. Platonic idealism is the theory that the substantive reality around us is only a reflection of a higher truth. That truth, Plato argues, is the abstraction. A particular tree, with a branch or two missing, possibly alive, possibly dead, and initials of two lovers carved into its bark, is distinct from the form of Tree-ness. A Tree is the ideal that each of us holds that allows us to identify the imperfect reflections of trees all around us.
Perhaps the most famous adherent of Dualism was Descartes, who proposed a type of Dualism that has come to be known as Cartesian dualism or Interaction Dualism. Cartesian dualism is the idea that Mind and Body are two fundamentally different types of things, but that they can interact. Physical events can cause mental events-- for example, the physical act of hitting your hand with a hammer can cause the mental experience of pain. Conversely, Mental events can cause physical events-- for example, the mental decision to speak can cause the physical act of your tongue to move.
Epiphenomenalism is another type of dualism. Like other forms of Dualism, it holds that Mind and Body are two fundamentally different types of things. Epiphenomenalism agrees with Cartesian dualism in saying that physical causes can give rise to mental events-- the physical act of hitting your hand with a hammer will create the mental experiene of pain. Unlike Cartesian dualism, Epiphenomenalism argues that mental events cannot under any circumstances give rise to physical effects. So, if my hand touches fire, the physical heat can cause the mental sensation of pain, and my hand instantly recoils. It might appear that the mental experience of pain caused the physical event of the hand pulling back. According to Epiphenomenalism, this is an illusion-- in reality, the physical heat directly caused both the sensation of the pain and the recoiling of the hand.
Parallelism is a form of dualism that argues that both mental and physical events are two fundamentally different types of things which can never interact in any way. This view admits that physical events appear to cause mental effects (Hitting your hand with a hammer appears to cause pain) and that mental events appear to cause physical effects (Deciding to speak appears to cause your tongue to move). Parallelism, however, holds that this correspondence between the mental world and the physical world is simply a correlation, not the result of causation. In this view, the mental world and the physical world are parallel, but separate, never directly interacting.
[edit] Physicalism
Physicalism is the idea that everything in the universe can be explained by physical entities such as matter and energy. In this view, while mental entities (such as thoughts and feelings) might at first appear to be a completely novel type of thing, in reality, the mental is completely explainable by the physical. For example, the software of a computer isn't some "magic" mental substance-- rather, the software is entirely explainable by looking at the computer's physical hardware. A computer's behavior is ultimately governed by physics. Physicalism argues that ultimately the physical world and its laws explain the behavior of everything in the universe, including the behavior of humans.
In colloquial speech, Physicalism is sometimes simply called Materialism. Technicially, however, Materialism is a very specific subtype of Physicalism which claims everything in the universe is matter. So Physicalism accepts non-material physical entities such as energy, space, and time; technically speaking, Materialism does not accept the independent existence of anything but matter.
[edit] Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism is the view that physical objects, properties, events (whatever is physical) are reducible to mental objects, properties, events. Ultimately, only mental objects exist. According to phenomenalism, the material world is not unlike a dream. When you have a vivid dream, you find yourself in a dream world that appears to be composed of material objects. In reality, however, everything in your dreamworld is a creation of your dream. If you dream you are riding a bicycle, the bicycle certainly feels real. In reality, however, the bicycle does not have an independent existence outside of your own mind. When you awaken, the bicycle will cease to be. Phenomenalism holds that the entire "real world" of our waking lives is fundementally a mental creation, not unlike the dream world.
[edit] Neutral monism
A fourth position is called neutral monism. This view denies that the Mental and the Physical are two fundamentally different things. Rather, Neutral monism claims the universe consists of only one kind of primal stuff, which in itself is neither mental nor physical, but is capable of both mental and physical aspects or attributes. This view was introduced by the 17th century Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza.
[edit] New Mysterianism
Another philosophical viewpoint, known as New Mysterianism, holds that the solution to the mind-body problem is unsolvable, particularly by humans. Just as a mouse could never understand human speech, perhaps humans simply lack the capacity to understand the solution to the mind-body problem.
[edit] Scientific perspectives
Most neuroscientists believe in the identity of mind and brain, a position that may be considered related to materialism and physicalism, though there is a subtle difference; namely, that postulating an identity between mind and brain (or more specifically, particular types of neuronal interactions) does not necessarily imply that mental events are 'nothing more' than physical events, but rather is more akin to saying that physical events and mental events are different aspects of a more fundamental mental-physical substratum which can be perceived as both mental and physical, depending on perspective.
Since most neuroscientists believe in the identity of mind and brain, it may not be surprising to hear that the search for the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) has become something of a Holy Grail in the neuroscientific community.
A major shift in the neurosciences occurred in the 1990s: the topic of consciousness and its relation to brain function has become a respectable topic that many neuroscientists take seriously. Prior to the 1990s, few neuroscientists spoke of consciousness, and even fewer would be bold enough to try to approach the topic scientifically. Consciousness was not considered a topic that was amenable to the methods of science. The tide change in the neuroscientific community of the 1990s is largely due to outspoken scientists such as Nobel-laureate Francis Crick, and philosophers such as David Chalmers. While neuroscience has not yet solved the mind-brain problem in terms of coming up with an NCC, to many in the field, the next decade looks promising. Future research may soon reveal how far science can go in addressing and solving the question of the mind-brain problem.
A research team at Caltech discovered in 2005 that individual brain cells can fire in response to visual stimuli of individual people or places, which conflicted with previous conjectures that visual recognition was an emergent phenomenon of large networks of neurons. This development gives weight to Roger Penrose's suggestion in his 1994 book Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness that the activity giving rise to consciousness occurs inside neurons at the scale where quantum phenomena transitions to classical physics.
[edit] See also
- consciousness
- Daniel Dennett
- dualism (philosophy of mind)
- functionalism (philosophy of mind)
- materialism
- Mental body
- Mind
- monism
- Odic force
- Thomas Nagel
- panpsychism
- Philosophy of mind
- physicalism
- pluralism (philosophy of mind)
- qualia
- solipsism
- supervenience
- Theory of mind
[edit] Notes and citations
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 The mind-body problem by Robert M. Young
- ↑ Turner 96, p.76
- ↑ Kim, J. (1995). Honderich, Ted Problems in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ↑ Pinel, J. Psychobiology, (1990) Prentice Hall, Inc. ISBN 8815071741
- ↑ LeDoux, J. (2002) The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are, New York:Viking Penguin. ISBN 8870787958
- ↑ Russell, S. and Norvig, P. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, New Jersey:Prentice Hall. ISBN 0131038052
- ↑ Dawkins, R. The Selfish Gene (1976) Oxford:Oxford University Press. ISBN
[edit] Bibliography
- Turner, Bryan S. Body and Society: Exploration in social theory 1996
[edit] External links
- The Mind-Brain Problem - an introduction for beginners (article in pdf format).
- Sci-Con.org - Science and Consciousness Review, a site maintained by such notables as Bernard Baars, among others.
- David Chalmers' Homepage - a large collection of essays from one of the leading philosophers in the consciousness field.
- Daniel C. Dennett's homepage at Tufts University
- Philosophy of the Mind - an index of the mind-body problem.
- Explaining the Mind: Problems, Problems
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