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Framing in the social sciences refers to a set of concepts and theoretical perspectives on how individuals, groups, and societies organize, perceive, and communicate about reality. Framing is commonly used in media studies, sociology, psychology, and political science.

DefinitionsEdit

Framing refers to the social construction of a social phenomenon often by mass media sources, political or social movements, political leaders, or other actors and organizations. It is an inevitable process of selective influence over the individual's perception of the meanings attributed to words or phrases. It is generally considered in one of two ways: as frames in thought, consisting of the mental representations, interpretations, and simplifications of reality, and frames in communication, consisting of the communication of frames between different actors.[1] Framing might also be understood as being either equivalence frames, which represent logically equivalent alternatives portrayed in different ways (see framing effect (psychology)) or as emphasis frames, which simplify reality by focusing on a subset of relevant aspects of a situation or issue.[1] In the context of politics or mass media communication, a frame defines the packaging of an element of rhetoric in such a way as to encourage certain interpretations and to discourage others.

In social theory, framing refers to a schema of interpretation, a collection of anecdotes and stereotypes, that individuals rely on to understand and respond to events.[2] In other words, people build a series of mental filters through biological and cultural influences. They use these filters to make sense of the world. The choices they then make are influenced by their creation of a frame. Framing is also a key component of sociology, the study of social interaction among humans.

Explanation Edit

When one seeks to explain an event, the understanding often depends on the frame referred to. If a friend rapidly closes and opens an eye, we will respond very differently depending on whether we attribute this to a purely "physical" frame (s/he blinked) or to a social frame (s/he winked).

Though the former might result from a speck of dust (resulting in an involuntary and not particularly meaningful reaction), the latter would imply a voluntary and meaningful action (to convey humor to an accomplice, for example). Observers will read events seen as purely physical or within a frame of "nature" differently than those seen as occurring with social frames. But we do not look at an event and then "apply" a frame to it. Rather, individuals constantly project into the world around them the interpretive frames that allow them to make sense of it; we only shift frames (or realize that we have habitually applied a frame) when incongruity calls for a frame-shift. In other words, we only become aware of the frames that we always already use when something forces us to replace one frame with another.[3][4]

Framing is so effective because it is a heuristic, or mental shortcut that may not always yield desired results; and is seen as a 'rule of thumb'. According to Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, human beings are by nature "cognitive misers", meaning they prefer to do as little thinking as possible.[5] Frames provide people a quick and easy way to process information. Hence, people will use the previously mentioned mental filters (a series of which is called a schema) to make sense of incoming messages. This gives the sender and framer of the information enormous power to use these schemas to influence how the receivers will interpret the message.[6]

Framing effect in communication researchEdit

In the field of communication, framing defines how news media coverage shapes mass opinion. To be specific, framing effects refer to behavioral or attitudinal outcomes that are due to how a given piece of information is being framed in public discourse. Today, many volumes of the major communication journals contain papers on media frames and framing effects [7]. Approaches used in such papers can be broadly classified into two groups: studies of framing as the dependent variable and studies of framing as the independent variable [8]. The former usually deals with frame building (i.e. how frames create societal discourse about an issue and how different frames are adopted by journalists) and latter concerns frame setting (i.e. how media framing influences an audience).

Frame buildingEdit

Frame building is related to at least three areas: journalist norms, political actors, and cultural contexts. It assumes that several media frames compete to set one frame regarding an issue, and one frame finally gains influence because it resonates with popular culture, fits with media practices, or is heavily sponsored by elites. First, in terms of practices of news production, there are at least five aspects of news work that may influence how journalists frame a certain issue: larger societal norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, external pressures from interest groups and other policy makers, professional routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists. The second potential influence on frame building comes from elites, including interest groups, government bureaucracies, and other political or corporate actors. Empirical studies show that these influences of elites seem to be strongest for issues in which journalists and various players in the policy arena can find shared narratives. Finally, cultural contexts of a society are also able to establish frame. Goffman [2] assumes that the meaning of a frame has implicit cultural roots. This context dependency of media frame has been described as 'cultural resonance' [9] or 'narrative fidelity'.[10]

Frame settingEdit

When people are exposed to a novel news frame, they will accept the constructs made applicable to an issue, but they are significantly more likely to do so when they have existing schema for those constructs. This is called the applicability effect. That is, when new frames invite people to apply their existing schema to an issue, the implication of that application depends, in part, on what is in that schema. Therefore, generally, the more the audiences know about issues, the more effective are frames, but not in all cases.

There are a number of levels and types of framing effects that have been examined. For example, scholars have focused on attitudinal and behavioral changes, the degrees of perceived importance of the issue, voting decisions, and opinion formations. Others are interested in psychological processes other than applicability. For instance, Iyengar [11] suggested that news about social problems can influence attributions of causal and treatment responsibility, an effect observed in both cognitive responses and evaluations of political leaders, or other scholars looked at the framing effects on receivers' evaluative processing style and the complexity of audience members' thoughts about issues.

Framing in mass communication researchEdit

Summary of framing as a concept in mass communication researchEdit

By emphasizing specific values, facts, and other considerations, news media frame all news items, endowing those particular values, facts, and other considerations with greater apparent applicability for making related judgments than they might otherwise have been given, promoting particular definitions, interpretations, evaluations, and/or recommendations for the described items.[12] [13]

Foundations of framing in mass communication researchEdit

Anthropologist Gregory Bateson first articulated the concept of framing in his 1972 book Steps to an Ecology of Mind. A frame, Bateson wrote, is "a spatial and temporal bonding of a set of interactive messages."[14]

Sociological roots of media framing researchEdit

Media framing research has both sociological and psychological roots. Sociological framing focuses on "the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles" that communicators use when relaying information to recipients.[1] Research on frames in sociologically driven media research generally examines the influence of "social norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists" on the existence of frames in media content.[15]

Todd Gitlin, in his analysis of how the news media trivialized the student New Left movement during the 1960s, was among the first to examine media frames from a sociological perspective. Frames, Gitlin wrote, are "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretations, and presentation, of selection [and] emphasis . . . [that are] largely unspoken and unacknowledged . . . [and] organize the world for both journalists [and] for those of us who read their reports."[16]

Psychological roots of media framing researchEdit

Research on frames in psychologically driven media research generally examines the effects of media frames on those who receive them. For example, Iyengar explored the impact of episodic and thematic news frames on viewers' attributions of responsibility for political issues including crime, terrorism, poverty, unemployment, and racial inequality.[17] According to Iyengar, an episodic news frame "takes the form of a case study or event-oriented report and depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances," while a thematic news frame "places public issues in some more general abstract context . . . directed at general outcomes or conditions."[12][17] Iyengar found that the majority of television news coverage of poverty, for example, was episodic.[17] In fact, in a content analysis of six years of television news, Iyengar found that the typical news viewer would have been twice as likely to encounter episodic rather than thematic television news about poverty.[17] Further, experimental results indicate participants who watched episodic news coverage of poverty were more than twice as likely as those who watched thematic news coverage of poverty to attribute responsibility of poverty to the poor themselves rather than society.[17] Given the predominance of episodic framing of poverty, Iyengar argues that television news shifts responsibility of poverty from government and society to the poor themselves.[17] After examining content analysis and experimental data on poverty and other political issues, Iyengar concludes that episodic news frames divert citizens' attributions of political responsibility away from society and political elites, making them less likely to support government efforts to address those issue and obscuring the connections between those issues and their elected officials' actions or lack thereof.[17]

Clarifying and distinguishing a "fractured paradigm"Edit

Perhaps because of their use across the social sciences, frames have been defined and used in many disparate ways. Entman called framing "a scattered conceptualization" and "a fractured paradigm" that "is often defined casually, with much left to an assumed tacit understanding of the reader."[12] In an effort to provide more conceptual clarity, Entman suggested that frames "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described."[12]

Entman's[12] conceptualization of framing, which suggests frames work by elevating particular pieces of information in salience, is in line with much early research on the psychological underpinnings of framing effects (see also Iyengar,[17] who argues that accessibility is the primary psychological explanation for the existence of framing effects). Wyer and Srull[18] explain the construct of accessibility thus:

  1. People store related pieces of information in "referent bins" in their long-term memory.[18]
  2. People organize "referent bins" such that more frequently and recently used pieces of information are stored at the top of the bins and are therefore more accessible.[18]
  3. Because people tend to retrieve only a small portion of information from long-term memory when making judgments, they tend to retrieve the most accessible pieces of information to use for making those judgments.[18]

The argument supporting accessibility as the psychological process underlying framing can therefore be summarized thus: Because people rely heavily on news media for public affairs information, the most accessible information about public affairs often comes from the public affairs news they consume. The argument supporting accessibility as the psychological process underlying framing has also been cited as support in the debate over whether framing should be subsumed by agenda-setting theory as part of the second level of agenda setting. McCombs and other agenda-setting scholars generally agree that framing should incorporated, along with priming, under the umbrella of agenda setting as a complex model of media effects linking media production, content, and audience effects.[19] [20][21] Indeed, McCombs, Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, and Rey justified their attempt to combine framing and agenda-setting research on the assumption of parsimony.[21]

Scheufele, however, argues that, unlike agenda setting and priming, framing does not rely primarily on accessibility, making it inappropriate to combine framing with agenda setting and priming for the sake of parsimony.[15] Empirical evidence seems to vindicate Scheufele's claim. For example, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley empirically demonstrated that applicability, rather than their salience, is key.[13] By operationalizing accessibility as the response latency of respondent answers where more accessible information results in faster response times, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley demonstrated that accessibility accounted for only a minor proportion of the variance in framing effects while applicability accounted for the major proportion of variance.[13] Therefore, according to Nelson and colleagues, "frames influence opinions by stressing specific values, facts, and other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might appear to have under an alternative frame."[13]

In other words, while early research suggested that by highlighting particular aspects of issues, frames make certain considerations more accessible and therefore more likely to be used in the judgment process,[12] [17] more recent research suggests that frames work by making particular considerations more applicable and therefore more relevant to the judgment process.[15] [13]

Equivalency versus emphasis: two types of frames in media researchEdit

Chong and Druckman suggest framing research has mainly focused on two types of frames: equivalency and emphasis frames.[22] Equivalency frames offer "different, but logically equivalent phrases," which cause individuals to alter their preferences.[23] Equivalency frames are often worded in terms of "gains" versus "losses." For example, Kahneman and Tversky asked participants to choose between two "gain-framed" policy responses to a hypothetical disease outbreak expected to kill 600 people.[24] Response A would saved 200 people while Response B had a one-third probability of saving everyone, but a two-thirds probability of saving no one. Although the choices are mathematically identical, participants overwhelmingly chose Response A, which they perceived as the less risky alternative. Kahneman and Tversky asked other participants to choose between two equivalent "loss-framed" policy responses to the same disease outbreak. In this condition, Response A would kill 400 people while Response B had a one-third probability of killing no one but a two-thirds probability of killing everyone. Although these responses are also mathematically identical (indeed, they are also mathematically identical to the responses in the "gain-framed" condition), participants overwhelmingly chose Response B, which they perceived as the riskier alternative. Kahneman and Tversky, then, demonstrated that when phrased in terms of potential gains, people tend to choose what they perceive as the less risky option (i.e., the sure gain). Conversely, when faced with a potential loss, people tend to choose what they perceive to be the riskier option.[24]

Unlike equivalency frames, emphasis frames offer "qualitatively different yet potentially relevant considerations" which individuals use to make judgments.[22] For example, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley exposed participants to a news story that presented the Ku Klux Klan's plan to hold a rally.[13] Participants in one condition read a news story that framed the issue in terms of public safety concerns while participants in the other condition read a news storied that framed the issue in terms of free speech considerations. Participants exposed to the public safety condition considered public safety applicable for deciding whether the Klan should be allowed to hold a rally and, as expected, expressed lower tolerance of the Klan's right to hold a rally.[13] Participants exposed to the free speech condition, however, considered free speech applicable for deciding whether the Klan should be allowed to hold a rally and, as expected, expressed greater tolerance of the Klan's right to hold a rally.[13]

A formal summary of media framingEdit

A review of media effects research suggests the concept of framing in mass communication research can be expressed using the following set of related propositions:

  1. From the world of possible news events, journalists act as gatekeepers, selecting issues, topics, and events to process and report as "the news."
  2. Because of limited space, time, and resources, however, many issues, topics, and events are ignored and are not published as news.
  3. For those issues, topics, and events that do become news, the same constraints - space, time, and resources - prevent journalists from including all possible perspectives and therefore news stories necessarily emphasize only certain values, facts, and other considerations.
  4. Beyond attending to various prominence cues to inform their perceptions of which issues, topics, and events are most important (this process is known as the agenda-setting process), citizens who consume news content come to understand each news event using the limited spectrum of values, facts, and other considerations included in the news story.
  5. Therefore, by emphasizing specific values, facts, and other considerations, news media frame all news items, endowing those particular values, facts, and other considerations with greater apparent applicability for making related judgments than they might otherwise have been given, promoting particular definitions, interpretations, evaluations, and/or recommendations for the described items.

Framing effect in psychology and economicsEdit

File:Daniel KAHNEMAN.jpg
Main article: Framing effect (psychology)

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have shown that framing can affect the outcome (ie. the choices one makes) of choice problems, to the extent that several of the classic axioms of rational choice do not hold.[25] This led to the development of prospect theory as an alternative to rational choice theory.[26]

The context or framing of problems adopted by decision-makers results in part from extrinsic manipulation of the decision-options offered, as well as from forces intrinsic to decision-makers, e.g., their norms, habits, and unique temperament.

Experimental demonstrationEdit

Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated systematic reversals of preference when the same problem is presented in different ways, for example in the Asian disease problem. Participants were asked to "imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows."

The first group of participants was presented with a choice between programs: In a group of 600 people,

  • Program A: "200 people will be saved"
  • Program B: "there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved, and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved"

72 percent of participants preferred program A (the remainder, 28 percent, opting for program B).

The second group of participants was presented with the choice between the following: In a group of 600 people,

  • Program C: "400 people will die"
  • Program D: "there is a one-third probability that nobody will die, and a two-third probability that 600 people will die"

In this decision frame, 78 percent preferred program D, with the remaining 22 percent opting for program C.

Programs A and C are identical, as are programs B and D. The change in the decision frame between the two groups of participants produced a preference reversal: when the programs were presented in terms of lives saved, the participants preferred the secure program, A (= C). When the programs were presented in terms of expected deaths, participants chose the gamble D (= B).[27]

Absolute and relative influencesEdit

Framing effects arise because one can frequently frame a decision using multiple scenarios, wherein one may express benefits either as a relative risk reduction (RRR), or as absolute risk reduction (ARR). Extrinsic control over the cognitive distinctions (between risk tolerance and reward anticipation) adopted by decision makers can occur through altering the presentation of relative risks and absolute benefits.

People generally prefer the absolute certainty inherent in a positive framing-effect, which offers an assurance of gains. When decision-options appear framed as a likely gain, risk-averse choices predominate.

A shift toward risk-seeking behavior occurs when a decision-maker frames decisions in negative terms, or adopts a negative framing effect.

In medical decision making, framing bias is best avoided by using absolute measures of efficacy.[28]

Frame-manipulation researchEdit

Researchers have found[25] that framing decision-problems in a positive light generally results in less-risky choices; with negative framing of problems, riskier choices tend to result. According to behavioral economists[citation needed]:

  • positive framing effects (associated with risk aversion) result from presentation of options as sure (or absolute) gains
  • negative framing effects (associated with a preference shift toward choosing riskier options) result from options presented as the relative likelihood of losses

Researchers have found[citation needed] that framing-manipulation invariably affects subjects, but to varying degrees. Individuals proved risk averse when presented with value-increasing options; but when faced with value decreasing contingencies, they tended towards increased risk-taking. Researchers [attribution needed] found that variations in decision-framing achieved by manipulating the options to represent either a gain or as a loss altered the risk-aversion preferences of decision-makers.

In one study, 57% of the subjects chose a medication when presented with benefits in relative terms, whereas only 14.7% chose a medication whose benefit appeared in absolute terms. Further questioning of the patients suggested that, because the subjects ignored the underlying risk of disease, they perceived benefits as greater when expressed in relative terms.[29]-

Theoretical modelsEdit

Researchers have proposed[citation needed] various models explaining the framing effect:

  • cognitive theories, such as the Fuzzy-trace theory, attempt to explain framing-effects by determining the amount of cognitive processing effort devoted to determining the value of potential gains and losses.
  • prospect theory explains the framing-effect in functional terms, determined by preferences for differing perceived values, based on the assumption that people give a greater weighting to losses than to equivalent gains.
  • motivational theories explain framing-effects in terms of hedonic forces affecting individuals, such as fears and wishes—based on the notion that negative emotions evoked by potential losses usually out-weigh the emotions evoked by hypothetical gains.
  • cognitive cost-benefit trade-off theory defines choice as a compromise between desires, either as a preference for a correct decision or a preference for minimized cognitive effort. This model, which dovetails elements of cognitive and motivational theories, postulates that calculating the value of a sure gain takes much less cognitive effort than that required to select a risky gain.

NeuroimagingEdit

Cognitive neuroscientists have linked the framing-effect to neural activity in the amygdala, and have identified another brain-region, the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC), that appears to moderate the role of emotion on decisions. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to monitor brain-activity during a financial decision-making task, they observed greater activity in the OMPFC of those research subjects less susceptible to framing-effects.[30]

Framing theory and frame analysis in sociologyEdit

Framing theory and frame analysis provide a broad theoretical approach that analysts have used in communication studies, news (Johnson-Cartee, 1995), politics, and social movements (among other applications).

According to some sociologists, the "social construction of collective action frames" involves "public discourse, that is, the interface of media discourse and interpersonal interaction; persuasive communication during mobilization campaigns by movement organizations, their opponents and countermovement organizations; and consciousness raising during episodes of collective action."[31]

HistoryEdit

Word-selection or diction has been a component of rhetoric since time immemorial. But most commentators attribute the concept of framing to the work of Erving Goffman on frame analysis and point especially to his 1974 book, Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Goffman used the idea of frames to label "schemata of interpretation" that allow individuals or groups "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" events and occurrences, thus rendering meaning, organizing experiences, and guiding actions.[32] Goffman's framing concept evolved out of his 1959 work, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, a commentary on the management of impressions. These works arguably depend on Kenneth Boulding's concept of image.[33]

Social movementsEdit

Sociologists have utilized framing to explain the process of social movements.[10] Movements act as carriers of beliefs and ideologies (compare memes). In addition, they operate as part of the process of constructing meaning for participants and opposers (Snow & Benford, 1988). Sociologists deem mass-movements "successful" when the frames projected align with the frames of participants to produce resonance between the two parties. Researchers of framing speak of this process as frame re-alignment.

Frame-alignmentEdit

Snow and Benford (1988) regard frame-alignment as an important element in social mobilization or movement. They argue that when individual frames become linked in congruency and complementariness, "frame alignment" occurs,[34] producing "frame resonance", a catalyst in the process of a group making the transition from one frame to another (although not all framing efforts prove successful). The conditions that affect or constrain framing efforts include the following:

  • "The robustness, completeness, and thoroughness of the framing effort". Snow and Benford (1988) identify three core framing-tasks, and state that the degree to which framers attend to these tasks will determine participant mobilization. They characterize the three tasks as the following:
    1. diagnostic framing for the identification of a problem and assignment of blame
    2. prognostic framing to suggest solutions, strategies, and tactics to a problem
    3. motivational framing that serves as a call to arms or rationale for action
  • The relationship between the proposed frame and the larger belief-system; centrality: the frame cannot be of low hierarchical significance and salience within the larger belief system. Its range and interrelatedness, if the framer links the frame to only one core belief or value that, in itself, has a limited range within the larger belief system, the frame has a high degree of being discounted.
  • Relevance of the frame to the realities of the participants; a frame must seem relevant to participants and must also inform them. Empirical credibility or testability can constrain relevancy: it relates to participant experience, and has narrative fidelity, meaning that it fits in with existing cultural myths and narrations.
  • Cycles of protest (Tarrow 1983a; 1983b); the point at which the frame emerges on the timeline of the current era and existing preoccupations with social change. Previous frames may affect efforts to impose a new frame.

Snow and Benford (1988) propose that once someone has constructed proper frames as described above, large-scale changes in society such as those necessary for social movement can be achieved through frame-alignment.

TypesEdit

Frame-alignment comes in four forms,: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation.

  1. Frame bridging involves the "linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 467). It involves the linkage of a movement to "unmobilized [sic] sentiment pools or public opinion preference clusters" (p. 467) of people who share similar views or grievances but who lack an organizational base.
  2. Frame amplification refers to "the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 469). This interpretive frame usually involves the invigorating of values or beliefs.
  3. Frame extensions represent a movement's effort to incorporate participants by extending the boundaries of the proposed frame to include or encompass the views, interests, or sentiments of targeted groups.
  4. Frame transformation becomes necessary when the proposed frames "may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 473).

When this happens, the securing of participants and support requires new values, new meanings and understandings. Goffman (1974, p. 43–44) calls this "keying", where "activities, events, and biographies that are already meaningful from the standpoint of some primary framework, in terms of another framework" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 474) such that they are seen differently. Two types of frame transformation exist:

  1. Domain-specific transformations, such as the attempt to alter the status of groups of people, and
  2. Global interpretive frame-transformation, where the scope of change seems quite radical—as in a change of world-views, total conversions of thought, or uprooting of everything familiar (for example: moving from communism to market capitalism; religious conversion, etc.).

Frame analysis as rhetorical criticismEdit

Although the idea of language-framing had been explored earlier by Kenneth Burke (terministic screens), political communication researcher Jim A. Kuypers first published work advancing "framing analysis" as a rhetorical perspective in 1997. His approach begins inductively by looking for themes that persist across time in a text (for Kuypers, primarily news narratives on an issue or event) and then determining how those themes are framed. Kuypers's work begins with the assumption that frames are powerful rhetorical entities that "induce us to filter our perceptions of the world in particular ways, essentially making some aspects of our multi-dimensional reality more noticeable than other aspects. They operate by making some information more salient than other information...."[35]

In his 2009 work, Rhetorical Criticism: Perspectives in Action[36] Kuypers offers a detailed template for doing framing analysis from a rhetorical perspective. According Kuypers, "Framing is a process whereby communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted by others in a particular manner. Frames operate in four key ways: they define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies. Frames are often found within a narrative account of an issue or event, and are generally the central organizing idea." [37] Kuypers's work is based on the premise that framing is a rhetorical process and as such it is best examined from a rhetorical point of view.

ApplicationsEdit

FinanceEdit

Preference reversals and other associated phenomena are of wider relevance within behavioural economics, as they contradict the predictions of rational choice, the basis of traditional economics. Framing biases affecting investing, lending, borrowing decisions make one of the themes of behavioral finance.

LawEdit

Edward Zelinsky has shown that framing effects can explain some observed behaviors of legislators.[38]

PoliticsEdit

Framing a political issue, a political party or a political opponent is a strategic goal in politics, particularly in the United States of America. Both the Democratic and Republican political parties compete to successfully harness its power of persuasion. According to the New York Times:

Even before the election, a new political word had begun to take hold of the party, beginning on the West Coast and spreading like a virus all the way to the inner offices of the Capitol. That word was 'framing.' Exactly what it means to 'frame' issues seems to depend on which Democrat you are talking to, but everyone agrees that it has to do with choosing the language to define a debate and, more important, with fitting individual issues into the contexts of broader story lines.
[39]

Because framing has the ability to alter the public’s perception, politicians engage in battles to determine how issues are framed. Hence, the way the issues are framed in the media reflects who is winning the battle. For instance, according to Robert Entman, professor of Communication at George Washington University, in the build-up to the Gulf War the conservatives were successful in making the debate whether to attack sooner or later, with no mention of the possibility of not attacking. Since the media picked up on this and also framed the debate in this fashion, the conservatives won.[6]

One particular example of Lakoff's work that attained some degree of fame was his advice to rename [40] trial lawyers (unpopular in the United States) as "public protection attorneys". Though Americans have not generally adopted this suggestion, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America did rename themselves the "American Association of Justice", in what the Chamber of Commerce called an effort to hide their identity.[41]

The New York Times depicted similar intensity among Republicans:

In one recent memo, titled 'The 14 Words Never to Use,' [Frank] Luntz urged conservatives to restrict themselves to phrases from what he calls ... the 'New American Lexicon.' Thus, a smart Republican, in Luntz's view, never advocates 'drilling for oil'; he prefers 'exploring for energy.' He should never criticize the 'government,' which cleans our streets and pays our firemen; he should attack 'Washington,' with its ceaseless thirst for taxes and regulations. 'We should never use the word outsourcing,' Luntz wrote, 'because we will then be asked to defend or end the practice of allowing companies to ship American jobs overseas.'
[39]

From a political perspective, framing has widespread consequences. For example, the concept of framing links with that of agenda-setting: by consistently invoking a particular frame, the framing party may effectively control discussion and perception of the issue. Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber in Trust Us, We're Experts illustrate how public-relations (PR) firms often use language to help frame a given issue, structuring the questions that then subsequently emerge. For example, one firm advises clients to use "bridging language" that uses a strategy of answering questions with specific terms or ideas in order to shift the discourse from an uncomfortable topic to a more comfortable one.[42] Practitioners of this strategy might attempt to draw attention away from one frame in order to focus on another. As Lakoff notes, "On the day that George W. Bush took office, the words "tax relief" started coming out of the White House."[43] By refocusing the structure away from one frame ("tax burden" or "tax responsibilities"), individuals can set the agenda of the questions asked in the future.

Cognitive linguists point to an example of framing in the phrase "tax relief". In this frame, use of the concept "relief" entails a concept of (without mentioning the benefits resulting from) taxes putting strain on the citizen:

The current tax code is full of inequities. Many single moms face higher marginal tax rates than the wealthy. Couples frequently face a higher tax burden after they marry. The majority of Americans cannot deduct their charitable donations. Family farms and businesses are sold to pay the death tax. And the owners of the most successful small businesses share nearly half of their income with the government. President Bush's tax cut will greatly reduce these inequities. It is a fair plan that is designed to provide tax relief to everyone who pays income taxes.
[44]

Alternative frames may emphasize the concept of taxes as a source of infrastructural support to businesses:

The truth is that the wealthy have received more from America than most Americans—not just wealth but the infrastructure that has allowed them to amass their wealth: banks, the Federal Reserve, the stock market, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the legal system, federally-sponsored research, patents, tax supports, the military protection of foreign investments, and much much more. American taxpayers support the infrastructure of wealth accumulation. It is only fair that those who benefit most should pay their fair share.
[45]

Frames can limit debate by setting the vocabulary and metaphors through which participants can comprehend and discuss an issue. They form a part not just of political discourse, but of cognition. In addition to generating new frames, politically-oriented framing research aims to increase public awareness of the connection between framing and reasoning.

ExamplesEdit

  • The initial response of the Bush administration to the assault of September 11, 2001 was to frame the acts of terror as crime. This framing was replaced within hours by a war metaphor, yielding the "War on Terror". The difference between these two framings is in the implied response. Crime connotes bringing criminals to justice, putting them on trial and sentencing them, whereas as war implies enemy territory, military action and war powers for government.[43][46]
  • RecentTemplate:Dated maintenance category popularization of the term "escalation" to describe an increase in American troop-levels in Iraq. This implies that the United States has deliberately increased the scope of conflict in a provocative manner. It also implies that U.S. strategy entails a long-term military presence in Iraq, whereas "surge" framing implies a powerful but brief, transitory increase in intensity.[47]
  • The "bad apple" frame, as in the proverb "one bad apple spoils the barrel". This frame implies that removing one underachieving or corrupt official from an institution will solve a given problem; an opposing frame presents the same problem as systematic or structural to the institution itself—a source of infectious and spreading rot.[48]
  • The "taxpayers money" frame, rather than public or government funds, which implies that individual taxpayers have a claim or right to set government policy based upon their payment of tax rather than their status as citizens or voters and that taxpayers have a right to control public funds that are the shared property of all citizens and also privileges individual self interest above group interest.[citation needed]
  • The "collective property" frame, which implies that property owned by individuals is really owned by a collective in which those individuals are members. This collective can be a territorial one, such as a nation, or an abstract one that does not map to a specific territory.
  • Program-names that may describe only the intended effects of a program but may also imply their effectiveness. These include the following:
    • "Foreign aid"[49] (which implies that spending money will aid foreigners, rather than harm them)
    • "Social security" (which implies that the program can be relied on to provide security for a society)
    • "Stabilisation policy" (which implies that a policy will have a stabilizing effect).
  • Based on opinion polling and focus groups, ecoAmerica, a nonprofit environmental marketing and messaging firm, has advanced the position that global warming is an ineffective framing due to its identification as a leftist advocacy issue. The organization has suggested to government officials and environmental groups that alternate formulations of the issues would be more effective.[50]
  • In her 2009 book Frames of War, Judith Butler argues that the justification within liberal-democracies for war, and atrocities committed in the course of war, (referring specifically to the current war in Iraq and to Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay) entails a framing of the (especially Muslim) 'other' as pre-modern/primitive and ultimately not human in the same way as citizens within the liberal order.[51]

See also Edit

Further reading Edit

  • Baars, B. (1988), A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Boulding, Kenneth E. (1956). The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society. Michigan University Press.
  • Carruthers, P. (2003), On Fodor's Problem, Mind and Language, vol. 18(5), pp. 502–523.
  • Clark, A. (1997), Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Cutting, Hunter and Makani Themba Nixon (2006). Talking the Walk: A Communications Guide for Racial Justice: AK Press
  • Dennett, D. (1978), Brainstorms, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Fairhurst, Gail T. and Sarr, Robert A. 1996. The Art of Framing: Managing the Language of Leadership. USA: Jossey-Bass, Inc.
  • Feldman, Jeffrey. (2007), Framing the Debate: Famous Presidential Speeches and How Progressives Can Use Them to Control the Conversation (and Win Elections). Brooklyn, NY: Ig Publishing.
  • Fodor, J.A. (1983), The Modularity of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Fodor, J.A. (1987), “Modules, Frames, Fridgeons, Sleeping Dogs, and the Music of the Spheres”, in Pylyshyn (1987).
  • Fodor, J.A. (2000), The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Ford, K.M. & Hayes, P.J. (eds.) (1991), Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem, New York: JAI Press.
  • Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. London: Harper and Row.
  • Goffman, E. (1974). Frame Analysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  • Goffman, E. (1959). Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday.
  • Goodman, N. (1954), Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Hanks, S. & McDermott, D. (1987), “Nonmonotonic Logic and Temporal Projection”, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 33(3), pp. 379–412.
  • Haselager, W.F.G. (1997). Cognitive science and folk psychology: the right frame of mind. London: Sage
  • Haselager, W.F.G. & Van Rappard, J.F.H. (1998), “Connectionism, Systematicity, and the Frame Problem”, Minds and Machines, vol. 8(2), pp. 161–179.
  • Hayes, P.J. (1991), “Artificial Intelligence Meets David Hume: A Reply to Fetzer”, in Ford & Hayes (1991).
  • Heal, J. (1996), “Simulation, Theory, and Content”, in Theories of Theories of Mind, eds. P. Carruthers & P. Smith, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 75–89.
  • Johnson-Cartee, K. (2005). News narrative and news framing: Constructing political reality. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
  • Kendall, Diana, Sociology In Our Times, Thomson Wadsworth, 2005, ISBN 0-534-64629-8 Google Print, p.531
  • Klandermans, Bert. 1997. The Social Psychology of Protest. Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980), Metaphors We Live By, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Leites, N. & Wolf, C., Jr. (1970). Rebellion and authority. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.
  • McAdam, D., McCarthy, J., & Zald, M. (1996). Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes—Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements. In D. McAdam, J. McCarthy & M. Zald (Eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements; Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (pp. 1–20). New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • McCarthy, J. (1986), “Applications of Circumscription to Formalizing Common Sense Knowledge”, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 26(3), pp. 89–116.
  • McCarthy, J. & Hayes, P.J. (1969), “Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence”, in Machine Intelligence 4, ed. D.Michie and B.Meltzer, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 463–502.
  • McDermott, D. (1987), “We've Been Framed: Or Why AI Is Innocent of the Frame Problem”, in Pylyshyn (1987).
  • Mithen, S. (1987), The Prehistory of the Mind, London: Thames & Hudson.
  • Nelson, T. E., Oxley, Z. M., & Clawson, R. A. (1997). Toward a psychology of framing effects. Political Behavior, 19(3), 221–246.
  • Pan. Z. & Kosicki, G. M. (2001). Framing as a strategic action in public deliberation. In S. D. Reese, O. H. Gandy, Jr., & A. E. Grant (Eds.), Framing public life: Perspectives on media and our understanding of the social world, (pp. 35–66). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
  • Pylyshyn, Z.W. (ed.) (1987), The Robot's Dilemma: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence, Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
  • Russell, S. & Wefald, E. (1991), Do the Right Thing: Studies in Limited Rationality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Scheufele, Dietram A. 1999. Framing as a theory of media effects. Journal of Communication, 49(1), 103–122.
  • Shanahan, Murray P. (1997), Solving the Frame Problem: A Mathematical Investigation of the Common Sense Law of Inertia, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 0262193841
  • Shanahan, Murray P. (2003), “The Frame Problem”, in The Macmillan Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, ed. L.Nadel, Macmillan, pp. 144–150.
  • Simon, H. (1957), Models of Man, New York: John Wiley.
  • Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1988). "Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization". International Social Movement Research, 1, 197–217.
  • Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). "Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation". American Sociological Review, 51, 464–481.
  • Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1996), “Fodor's Frame Problem and Relevance Theory”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 19(3), pp. 530–532.
  • Tarrow, S. (1983a). "Struggling to Reform: social Movements and policy change during cycles of protest". Western Societies Paper No. 15. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
  • Tarrow, S. (1983b). "Resource mobilization and cycles of protest: Theoretical reflections and comparative illustrations". Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Detroit, August 31–September 4.
  • Tilly, C., Tilly, L., & Tilly, R. (1975). The rebellious century, 1830–1930. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
  • Turner, R. H., & Killian, L. M. (1972). Collective Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
  • Wilkerson, W.S. (2001), “Simulation, Theory, and the Frame Problem”, Philosophical Psychology, vol. 14(2), pp. 141–153.
  • Willard, Charles Arthur Liberalism and the Social Grounds of Knowledge Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.


External links Edit

Progressive framework institutes Edit

Conservative framework institutes Edit

References Edit

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 Druckman, J.N., (2001). The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence. Political Behavior 23(3), 225-256.
  2. 2.0 2.1 Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An easy on the organization of experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/methods/publications/frameanalysis/
  3. This example borrowed from Clifford Geertz: Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (1983), Basic Books 2000 paperback: ISBN 0-465-04162-0
  4. Goffman offers the example of the woman bidding on a mirror at an auction who first examines the frame and surface for imperfections, and then "checks" herself in the mirror and adjusts her hat. See Goffman, Erving. Frame Analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986. ISBN 0-930350-91-X, page 39. In each case the mirror represents more than simply a physical object.
  5. Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill
  6. 6.0 6.1 Entman,Robert "Tree Beard". Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication; Autumn 1993, 43, 4, p.51
  7. Scheufele, D. A. & Iyengar, S. (forthcoming). The state of framing research: A call for new directions. In K. kENSKI, & K. H. Jamieson (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of political communication theories. New York: Oxford University Press.
  8. Tewksbury & Scheufele (2009).News framing theory and research, In J. Bryant, & M. B. Oliver (Eds.) Media effects: Advances in theory and research, New York: Routledge.
  9. Gamson, W. A. & Modigliani, A. (1987) The changing culture of affirmative action. Research in Political Sociology, 3, 137-177
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  11. Iyengar, S. (1991). Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  12. 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 Entman, R.M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication 43 (4): 51–58.
  13. 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 Nelson, T.E., Clawson, R.A., & Oxley, Z.M. (1997). Media framing of a civil liberties conflict and its effect on tolerance. American Political Science Review 91 (3): 567–583.
  14. Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an Ecology of Mind, New York: Ballantine Books.
  15. 15.0 15.1 15.2 Scheufele, D.A. (2000). Agenda-setting, priming, and framing revisited: Another look at cognitive effects of political communication. Mass Communication & Society 3 (2&3): 297–316.
  16. Gitlin, T. (1980). The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
  17. 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7 17.8 Iyengar, S. (1991). Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  18. 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 Wyer, Jr., R.S.; Srull, T.K. (1984). "Category Accessibility: Some theoretic and empirical issues concerning the processing of social stimulus information" E.T. Higgins, N.A. Kuiper, & M.P Zanna (Eds.) Social Cognition: The Ontario Symposium, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
  19. Kosicki, G.M. (1993). Problems and opportunities in Agenda-setting research. Journal of Communication 43 (2): 100–127.
  20. McCombs, M.E., Shaw, D.L. (1993). The evolution of agenda-setting research: Twenty-five years in the marketplace of ideas. Journal of Communication 43 (2): 58–67.
  21. 21.0 21.1 McCombs, M.F., Llamas, J.P., Lopez-Escobar, E., & Rey, F. (1997). Candidate images in Spanish elections: Second-level agenda-setting effects. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 74 (4): 703–717.
  22. 22.0 22.1 Chong, D., Druckman, J.N. (2007). Framing theory. Annual Review of Political Science 10: 103–126.
  23. Tversky, A.; Kahneman, D. (1987). "Rational choice and the framing of decisions" R.M. Hogarth & M.W. Reder (Eds.) Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, 67–94, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  24. 24.0 24.1 Khaneman, D., Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American Psychologist 39 (4): 341–350.
  25. 25.0 25.1 (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science 211 (4481): 453–458.
  26. Econport. "Decision-Making Under Uncertainty - Advanced Topics: An Introduction to Prospect Theory". (EconPort is an economics digital library specializing in content that emphasizes the use of experiments in teaching and research.) [1]
  27. includeonly>Template error: argument title is required., pages 53-54.
  28. Perneger TV, Agoritsas T (2011). Doctors and Patients' Susceptibility to Framing Bias: A Randomized Trial. J Gen Intern Med 26 (12): 1411–7.
  29. The framing effect of relative and absolute risk. [J Gen Intern Med. 1993] - PubMed Result
  30. (2006). Frames, biases, and rational decision-making in the human brain. Science 313 (5787): 684–687.
  31. Bert Klandermans. 1997. The Social Psychology of Protest. Oxford: Blackwell, page 45
  32. Erving Goffman (1974). Frame Analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, page 21.
  33. Kenneth Boulding: The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society, University of Michigan Press, 1956)
  34. Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. American Sociological Review, 51, page 464
  35. Jim A. Kuypers, Rhetorical Criticism: Perspectives in Action , Lexington Press, 2009
  36. Rhetorical Criticism: Perspectives in Action
  37. Jim A. Kuypers, Bush's War: Media Bias and Justifications for War in a Terrorist Age , Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009.
  38. Zelinsky, Edward A.. 2005. Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis. Virginia Tax Review 24. [2]
  39. 39.0 39.1 The Framing Wars. New York Times 17 July 2005
  40. Walter Olson, Overlawyered weblog, 2005-07-18
  41. Al Kamen, "Forget Cash -- Lobbyists Should Set Support for Lawmakers in Stone", Washington Post, 2007-01-17
  42. Rampton, Sheldon and Stauber, John. Trust Us, We're Experts! Putnam Publishing, New York, NY, 2002. Page 64.
  43. 43.0 43.1 Lakoff, George (2004). Don't think of an elephant!: know your values and frame the debate, 56, Chelsea Green Publishing..
  44. The President's Agenda for Tax Relief retrieved 3 July 2007.}}
  45. Cognitive Policy Works/Rockridge Institute: Simple Framing
  46. Zhang, Juyan (2007). Beyond anti-terrorism: Metaphors as message strategy of post-September-11 U.S. public diplomacy. Public Relations Review 33 (1): 31–39.
  47. "It's Escalation, Stupid." Alternet retrieved 3 July 2007
  48. "The Rumsfeld Dilemma: Demand an Exit Strategy, Not a Facelift" by Bruce Budner, in The Huffington Post 15 September 2006
  49. "Is It All in a Word? The Effect of Issue Framing on Public Support for U.S. Spending on HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries." by Sara Bleich. Retrieved 2007-07-03
  50. "Seeking to Save the Planet, With a Thesaurus" article by John M. Broder in The New York Times May 1, 2009
  51. Butler, J. (2009), Frames of War, London: Verso.

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