Epistemology

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Epistemology, from the Greek words episteme (knowledge) and logos (word/speech) is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature, origin and scope of knowledge. Historically, it has been one of the most investigated and most debated of all philosophical subjects. Much of this debate has focused on analysing the nature and variety of knowledge and how it relates to similar notions such as truth and belief. Much of this discussion concerns the justification of knowledge claims, that is the grounds on which one can claim to know a particular fact.

Not surprisingly, the way that knowledge claims are justified both leads to and depends on the general approach to philosophy one adopts. Thus, philosophers have developed a range of epistemological theories to accompany their general philosophical positions. More recent studies have re-written centuries-old assumptions, and the field of epistemology continues to be vibrant and dynamic.

Defining knowledge

Justified true belief

In Plato's dialogue the Theaetetus, Socrates considers a number of definitions of knowledge. One of the prominent candidates is justified true belief. We know that for something to count as knowledge it must be true and be believed to be true (see section on defining belief in Epistemology, below). Socrates argues that this is insufficient; in addition one must have a reason or justification for that belief.

One implication of this definition is that one cannot be said to "know" something just because one believes something that subsequently turns out to be true. An ill person with no medical training, but a generally optimistic attitude, might believe that she will recover from her illness quickly. But even if this belief turned out to be true, on the Theaetetus account, the patient did not know that she would get well because her belief lacked justification.

Knowledge, therefore, is distinguished from true belief by its justification, and much of epistemology is concerned with how true beliefs might be properly justified. This is sometimes referred to as the theory of justification.

The Theaetetus definition agrees with the common sense notion that we can believe things without knowing them. Whilst knowing p entails that p is true, believing in p does not, since we can have false beliefs. It also implies that we believe everything that we know. That is, the things we know form a subset of the things we believe.

For most of philosophical history, "knowledge" was taken to mean belief that was justified as true to an absolute certainty. Any less justified beliefs were called mere "probable opinion." This viewpoint still prevailed at least as late as Bertrand Russell's early 20th century book The Problems of Philosophy. In the decades that followed, however, the notion that the belief had to be justified to a certainty lost favour.

Gettier cases and contemporary definitions of knowledge

Main article: Gettier problem

In the 1960s, Edmund Gettier argued that there are situations in which a belief may be justified and true, and yet would not count as knowledge - overturning in a few short pages a theory that had been dominant for thousands of years. Although being a justified, true belief is necessary for a statement to count as knowledge, it is not, Gettier demonstrated, sufficient. Gettier says that formulations of the following form are flawed:

S knows that P if and only if:

• P
• S believes that P, and
• S is justified in believing that P.

This is because we can conceive of circumstances in which a person might have a good reason to believe a general proposition true, be correct, but not be correct for the reasons which she takes herself to be. Gettier gives the example of two persons, Smith and Jones, who are awaiting the results of their applications for the same job, both of whom have ten coins in their pockets. Smith has excellent reasons to believe that Jones will get the job and is furthermore correct in his belief that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket (he saw them counted just a moment before). From this he infers that ‘a person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job’. However, Smith doesn’t know that he himself also has 10 coins in his pocket. In fact, Smith is to get the job – his reasons to believe otherwise were excellent, but wrong. His belief that ‘a person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job’ satisfies all the above conditions, but still we would be hesitant to say that he knew what he thought he knew, because the reasons he took to justify his belief, while strong, were not the reasons which would have correctly justified his belief. (Which might have included the knowledge of ‘I have ten coins in my pocket’ and an overriding reason to believe that he would get the job).

Someone might want to say that, in fact, as far as they are concerned in the example given, Smith really does ‘know’ that ‘someone with ten coins in their pocket’ will get the job, but many people find this hard to accept.

Responses to Gettier

Gettier's article was published in 1963. Since then, there have been an enormous number of articles trying to provide an adequate definition of knowledge, several of which have been an attempt to supply a further fourth condition. Robert Nozick offers this formulation:

S knows that P if and only if:

• P
• S believes that P
• If not P, S would not believe that P
• If P, S will believe that P

Simon Blackburn offers a critique of this formulation, in which he suggests that we do not want to accept as knowledge beliefs which, while they 'track the truth' (as Nozick's account requires), are not held for appropriate reasons. He says that 'we do not want to award the title of knowing something to someone who is only meeting the conditions through a defect, flaw, or failure, compared with someone else who is not meeting the conditions.'

In another response to Gettier, Richard Kirkham has argued that the failures to find an account of knowledge immune from counterexamples is because the only definition that could ever be immune to all such counterexamples is the original one that prevailed from ancient times through Russell: to qualify as an item of knowledge, a belief must not only be true and justified, the evidence for the belief must necessitate its truth. Though this seems to set a very high hurdle for truth, Kirkham notes that it doesn't exclude the possibility of rational belief altogether.

Some of the proposed solutions involve factors external to the agent. These responses are known as theories of externalism. For example, one externalist response to the Gettier problem is to say that the justified, true belief must be caused (in the right sort of way) by the relevant facts.

Contemporary approaches

Much contemporary work in epistemology depends on the two categories: foundationalism and coherentism.

Recently, Susan Haack has attempted to fuse these two approaches into her doctrine of Foundherentism, which accrues degrees of relative confidence to beliefs by mediating between the two approaches. She covers this in her book Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology. Timothy Williamson, in his book Knowledge and its Limits, seeks to revert the traditional conceptual priority of belief to knowledge, instead seeing belief as dependent on knowledge

Defining 'belief' in Epistemology

File:Classical-Definition-of-Kno.gif

Knowledge is true and believed and ...

Sometimes, when people say they 'believe in' something, what they mean is that they predict that it will prove to be useful or successful in some sense - perhaps someone might 'believe in' his or her favourite football team. This is not what Epistemologists mean.

In the second sense of belief, to believe something just means to think that it is true. That is, to believe P is to do no more than to think, for whatever reason, that P is the case. The reason is that in order to know something, one must think that it is true - one must believe (in the second sense) it to be the case.

Consider someone saying "I know that P, but I don't think P is true". The person making this utterance has, in a profound sense, contradicted himself. If one knows that P, then, amongst other things, one thinks that P is indeed true. If one thinks that P is true, then one believes P. (See: Moore's paradox.)

Knowledge is distinct from belief and opinion. If someone claims to believe something,he is claiming that he thinks that it is the truth. But of course, it might turn out that he was mistaken, and that what he thought was true was actually false. This is not the case with knowledge. For example, suppose that Jeff thinks that a particular bridge is safe, and attempts to cross it; unfortunately the bridge collapses under his weight. We might say that Jeff believed that the bridge was safe, but that his belief was mistaken. We would not say that he knew that the bridge was safe, because plainly it was not. For something to count as knowledge, it must be true.

Similarly, two people can believe things that are mutually contradictory, but they cannot know (unequivocally) things that are mutually contradictory. For example, Jeff can believe the bridge safe, while Jenny believes it unsafe. But Jeff cannot know the bridge is safe and Jenny cannot know that the bridge is unsafe simultaneously. Two people cannot know contradictory things.

Distinguishing knowing that from knowing how

Suppose that Fred says to you: "The fastest swimming stroke is the front crawl. One performs the front crawl by oscillating the legs at the hip, and moving the arms in an approximately circular motion". Here, Fred has propositional knowledge of swimming and how to perform the front crawl.

However, if Fred acquired this propositional knowledge from an encyclopedia, he will not have acquired the skill of swimming: he has some propositional knowledge, but does not have any procedural knowledge or "know-how". In general, one can demonstrate know-how by performing the task in question, but it is harder to demonstrate propositional knowledge. Michael Polanyi popularised the term tacit knowledge to distinguish the ability to do something from the ability to describe how to do something. Gilbert Ryle had previously made a similar point in discussing the characteristics of intelligence. His ideas are summed up in the aphorism "efficient practice precedes the theory of it". Someone with the ability to perform the appropriate moves is said to be able to swim, even if that person cannot precisely identify what it is he does in order to swim. This distinction is often traced back to Plato, who used the term techne or skill for knowledge how, and the term episteme for a more robust kind of knowledge in which claims can be true or false.

A priori versus a posteriori knowledge

Western philosophers for centuries have distinguished between two kinds of knowledge: a priori and a posteriori knowledge.

• A priori knowledge is knowledge gained or justified by reason alone, without the direct or indirect influence of any particular experience (here, experience usually means observation of the world through sense perception. See Rationalism, below, for clarification.)
• A posteriori knowledge is any other sort of knowledge; that is, knowledge the attainment or justification of which requires reference to experience. This is also called empirical knowledge.

One of the fundamental questions in epistemology is whether there is any non-trivial a priori knowledge. Generally speaking rationalists believe that there is, while empiricists believe that all knowledge is ultimately derived from some kind of external experience.

The fields of knowledge most often suggested as having a priori status are logic and mathematics, which deal primarily with abstract, formal objects.

Empiricists have traditionally denied that even these fields could be a priori knowledge. Two common arguments are that these sorts of knowledge can only be derived from experience (as John Stuart Mill argued), and that they do not constitute "real" knowledge (as David Hume argued).

Justification

Much of epistemology has been concerned with seeking ways to justify beliefs.

Irrationalism

Some approaches to justifying beliefs are not rational — that is, they reject the notion that justification must obey logic or reason. Nihilism started out as a materialistic political philosophy, but is sometimes redefined as the apparently absurd doctrine that there can be no justification for any claim — absurd because the doctrine implies that nihilism itself cannot be justified.

One definition of contemporary Mysticism is the use of non-rational methods to arrive at beliefs and the acceptance of such beliefs as knowledge. For example, believing that something is true based on emotion may be regarded as epistemological mysticism. An instance of this may be when one bases one's belief in the existence of something merely on one's desire that it should exist. Another example might be the use of a daisy's petals and the phrase "he loves me / he loves me not" while they are plucked to determine whether Romeo returns Juliet's affections. The mysticism in this example would be the assumption that such a method has predictive or indicative powers without rational evidence of this (this does not necessarily lessen its importance as a symbolic tool in human thought). In both of these examples, belief is not justified through rational means. Mysticism need not be an intentional process: one may engage in mystical thought without realizing it.

Contemporary Mysticism should not be confused with traditional Mysticism, which is a spiritual practice in many Eastern religions. It is the practice of focusing thought that is important to traditional mysticism, rather than the content of the thought. One difficulty precident in many forms of mysticism is the suspension of disbelief as conflicting beliefs are said to interfere with the supernatural spiritual or mental abilities. This can be criticized as not solely suspending disbelief, but in requiring an irrational belief of the possibility of the promised potential outcomes.

Rationality

Philosophical skeptics maintain that much of what we typically take to be knowledge is not in fact knowledge. In contrast to mystics, most skeptics attempt to present logical arguments for their claims.

For instance, the regress argument has it that one can ask for the justification for any belief. If that justification depends on another belief, one can also reasonably ask for the latter belief to be justified, and so forth. This appears to lead to an infinite regress, with each belief justified by some further belief. The apparent impossibility of completing an infinite chain of reasoning is thought by some to support skepticism.

Some philosophers, notably Peter Klein, have argued that it is not impossible to have an infinite series of reasons and that such an infinite series could explain how we have knowledge. This position is known as infinitism. Infinitists typically take the infinite series to be merely potential, in the sense that an individual may have indefinitely many reasons available to him, without having consciously thought through all of these reasons. The individual need only have the ability to bring forth the relevant reasons when the need arises. This position is motivated in part by the desire to avoid skepticism.

Foundationalists respond to the regress argument by claiming that some beliefs that are fit to support other beliefs and knowledge do not themselves require justification. Sometimes these foundational beliefs are characterized as beliefs about what one is directly aware of, or as beliefs that are self-justifying, or as beliefs that are infallible. According to one particularly permissive form of foundationalism, a belief may count as foundational, in the sense that it may be presumed true until defeating evidence appears, as long as the belief appears to the subject to be true.

Another response to the regress problem is to reject the assumption that beliefs can only be justified by linear chains of reasoning. Coherentism holds that an individual belief is justified not by such linear reasoning but by the way the belief fits together (coheres) with the rest of one's belief system. This has the advantage of avoiding the infinite regress without claiming special status for some particular class of beliefs. But since a system can be coherent and yet still be wrong, coherentists face the difficulty of ensuring that the whole system corresponds in some way with reality.

Synthetic and analytic statements

Some statements are such that they appear not to need any justification once one understands their meaning. For example, consider: my father's brother is my uncle. This statement is true in virtue of the meaning of the terms it contains, and so it seems frivolous to ask for a justification for saying it is true. Philosophers call such statements analytic. More technically, a statement is analytic if the concept in the predicate is included in the concept in the subject. In the example, the concept of uncle (the predicate) is included in the concept of being my father's brother (the subject). Not all analytic statements are as trivial as this example. Mathematical statements are often taken to be analytic.

Synthetic statements, on the other hand, have distinct subjects and predicates. An example would be my father's brother is overweight.

Although anticipated by David Hume, this distinction was more clearly formulated by Immanuel Kant, and later given a more formal shape by Frege. Wittgenstein noted in the Tractatus that analytic statements "express no thoughts", that is, that they tell us nothing new; although analytic statements do not require justification, they are singularly uninformative. W.V.O. Quine, in his famous Two Dogmas of Empiricism, challenged the legitimacy of the analytic-synthetic distinction altogether.

Epistemological theories

It is common for epistemological theories to avoid skepticism by adopting a foundationalist approach. To do this, they argue that certain types of statements have a special epistemological status — that of not needing to be justified. So it is possible to classify epistemological theories according to the type of statement that each argues has this special status.

Empiricism

Empiricists claim knowledge is a product of human experience. Statements of observations take pride of place in empiricist theory. Naïve empiricism holds simply that our ideas and theories need to be tested against reality, and accepted or rejected on the basis of how well they correspond to observed facts. The central problem for epistemology then becomes explaining this correspondence.

Empiricism is associated with science. While there can be little doubt about the effectiveness of science, there is much philosophical debate about how and why science works. The Scientific Method was once favoured as the reason for scientific success, but recent difficulties in the philosophy of science have led to a rise in coherentism.

Empiricism is sometimes associated with a tradition called logical empiricism, or positivism, which places higher emphasis on ideas about reality rather than on experiences of reality.

Idealism

Idealism holds that what we refer to and perceive as the external world is in some way an artifice of the mind. Analytic statements (for example, mathematical truths), are held to be true without reference to the external world, and these are taken to be exemplary knowledge statements. George Berkeley, Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel held various idealist views. Idealism is itself a metaphysical thesis, but has important epistemological consequences.

Naïve realism

Naïve realism, sometimes called Common Sense realism, is the belief that there is a real external world, and that our perceptions are caused directly by that world. It has its foundation in causation in that an object being there causes us to see it. Thus, it follows, the world remains as it is when it is perceived - when it is not being perceived - a room is still there once we exit. The opposite theory to this is solipsism. Some argue that naïve realism fails to take into account the psychology of perception, but naïve realists argue that viewing the psychology of perception as a problem for naïve realism requires begging the question in favor of idealism. (See: G.E. Moore.)

Phenomenalism

Phenomenalism is a development from George Berkeley's claim that to be is to be perceived. According to phenomenalism, when you see a tree, you see a certain perception of a brown shape, when you touch it, you get a perception of pressure against your palm. On this view, one shouldn't think of objects as distinct substances, which interact with our senses so that we may perceive them; rather we should conclude that the perception itself is all that really exists.

Pragmatism

Pragmatism about knowledge holds that what is important about knowledge is that it solves certain problems that are constrained both by the world and by human purposes. The place of knowledge in human activity is to resolve the problems that arise in conflicts between belief and action. Pragmatists are also typically committed to the use of the experimental method in all forms of inquiry, a non-skeptical fallibilism about our current store of knowledge, and the importance of knowledge proving itself through future testing.

Rationalism

Rationalists believe that there are a priori or innate ideas that are not derived from sense experience. These ideas, however, may be justified by experience. These ideas may in some way derive from the structure of the human mind, or they may exist independently of the mind. If they exist independently, they may be understood by a human mind once it reaches a necessary degree of sophistication.

The epitome of the rationalist view is Descartes' Cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"), in which the skeptic is invited to consider that the mere fact that he doubts this claim implies that there is a doubter. Because doubting is a kind of thinking, the claim must be correct. Spinoza derived a rationalist system in which there is only one substance, God. Leibniz derived a system in which there are an infinite number of substances, his Monads.

Representationalism

Representationalism or representative realism, unlike naïve realism, proposes that we cannot see the external world directly, but only through our perceptual representations of it. In other words, the objects and the world that you see around you are not the world itself, but merely an internal virtual-reality replica of that world. The so-called veil of perception removes the real world from our direct inspection.

Relativism

Relativism as advocated by Protagoras maintains that all things are true and in a constant state of flux, revealing certain aspects of truth at one time while concealing them at another. It claims that there is no objective truth: anything which a person can perceive is true for that person, but not necessarily true for the next person. By equating perceptions and beliefs with truth, overt self-contradiction is avoided.

Skepticism

Philosophical skepticism holds that one can never have sufficient justification in a belief to have knowledge. By contrast, scientific skepticism is the practical stance that one should accept claims only given solid evidence.

See also

• Contextualism
• Eastern epistemology
• Ethics
• Evidentialism
• Methodology
• Methods of obtaining knowledge
• Perception
• Philosophy of science
• Reason
• Science education
• Scientific modeling
• Self-evidence
• Social epistemology
• Subjective idealism
• Transcendental idealism
• Virtue epistemology
• Analytic tradition
• Bayesian probability
• Evidentiality (linguistics)

External links and references

• The Epistemology Page by Keith DeRose
• Epistemology Papers by Michael Huemer
• Epistemology Introduction, Part 1 and *Part 2 by Paul Newall at the Galilean Library.
• Marjorie Clay (ed.), Teaching Theory of Knowledge, The Council for Philosophical Studies, 1986.
• Boufoy-Bastick, Z. (2005). Introducing 'Applicable Knowledge' as a Challenge to the Attainment of Absolute Knowledge. Sophia Journal of Philosophy, 8, 39-51.
• Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? from Analysis, Vol. 23, pp. 121-23 (1963) by Edmund L. Gettier, transcribed by Andrew Chrucky (Sept. 13, 1997).
• Richard Kirkham, "Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?" Mind, 93, 1984.
• Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912)
• Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (1979)
• Groovyweb
• Philosophy online
• An Introduction to Epistemology by Paul Newall, aimed at beginners.
• Reformed Epistemology by Tim Holt
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
  • Epistemology
  • Bayesian Epistemology
  • Evolutionary Epistemology
  • Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
  • Naturalized Epistemology
  • Social Epistemology
  • Virtue Epistemology
  • Sense Data
• Articles on Christian Epistemology
• Certain Doubts (interactive epistemic discussion)

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