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In psychology, and the cognitive sciences more generally, enactivism is a theoretical approach to understanding the mind. It incorporates an historical perspective -- in the sense that each individual's developmental trajectory shapes their understanding of reality -- with the result that it can be seen to subsume and synthesize arguments from embodied and situated cognition to present an alternative to cognitivism.
|“||Enactivists criticize representational views of the mind and emphasize the importance of embodiment and action to cognition.||”|
At a fundamental level, enactivism is anti-dualist. There is no "core" self, but there is rather an enchained set of context-dependent associations that collectively provide a point-of-view in approaching the momentary problems of being. In this sense, individuals can be seen to "grow into" the world; it is not, a priori, "represented."
Scholars with sympathetic ideas
- McGann, M. & Torrance, S. (2005). Doing it and meaning it (and the relationship between the two). In R. D. Ellis & N. Newton, Consciousness & Emotion, vol. 1: Agency, conscious choice, and selective perception. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. ISBN 1-58811-596-8
- Hutto, D. D. (Ed.) (in press). Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, phenomenology, and narrative. In R. D. Ellis & N. Newton (Series Eds.), Consciousness & Emotion, vol. 2. ISBN 90-272-4151-1
- ↑ Burman, J. T. (2006). [Review of the book Consciousness & Emotion, vol. 1: Agency, conscious choice, and selective perception.], Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(12), pp. 115-119. Full-text
- ↑ Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
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