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'''Casuistry''' (argument by cases) is an attempt to determine the correct response to a [[moral]] [[problem]], often a [[moral dilemma]], by drawing conclusions based on parallels with agreed responses to pure cases, also called [[paradigm]]s (from the [[Greek language|Greek]] word παράδειγμα (''paradeigma'') which means "pattern" or "example", from the word παραδεικνύναι (''paradeiknunai'') meaning "demonstrate"). Casuistry, which most famous example remains the [[Jesuit]] casuistry, attacked by [[Pascal]] in the ''[[Provincial Letters]]'' (1656-1657) is a method of ethical [[case analysis]]. Used with a negative connotation, ''casuistry'' refers to reasoning that is specious or hair-splitting and seen as intentionally misleading.
 
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'''Casuistry''' ({{pronEng|ˈkæʒuːɨstri}}) is an [[applied ethics]] term referring to case-based [[reasoning]]. Casuistry is used in juridical and ethical discussions of [[law]] and [[ethics]], and often is a critique of [[principle]]-based reasoning<ref>[http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-35 "Casuistry", ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas,'' University of Virginia Library. On line.]</ref>.
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For example, while a principle-based approach might claim that [[Lie|lying]] is always morally wrong, the casuist would argue that, depending upon the details of the case, lying might or might not be illegal or unethical. For instance, the casuist might conclude that a person is wrong to lie in legal [[testimony]] under oath, but might argue that lying actually is the best moral choice if the lie saves a life ([[Thomas Sanchez]] and others thus theorized a [[doctrine of mental reservation]]). For the casuist, the circumstances of a case are essential for evaluating the proper response.
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Typically, casuistic reasoning begins with a clear-cut paradigmatic case (from ''paradigm'', the [[Greek language|Greek]] word παράδειγμα, ''paradeigma'', "pattern" and "example", in turn derived from παραδεικνύναι ''paradeiknunai'', "demonstrate"). In legal reasoning, for example, this might be a [[precedent]] case, such as pre-meditated [[murder]]. From it, the casuist would ask how closely the given case currently under consideration matches the paradigmatic case. Cases like the paradigmatic case ought to be treated like-wise; cases unlike the paradigm ought to be treated differently. Thus, a man is properly charged with pre-meditated murder if the circumstances surrounding his case closely resemble the exemplar pre-meditated murder case. The less a given case is like the paradigm, the weaker the justification is for treating that case ''like'' the paradigmatic case.
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Western casuistry dates from [[Aristotle]] (384–322 B.C.), yet the zenith of casuistry was from A.D. 1550 to A.D. 1650, when the [[Jesuit]] religious order extensively used casuistry, particularly in practicing the private, [[Roman Catholic]] [[confessional]]. The term ''casuistry'' quickly became pejorative with [[Blaise Pascal]]'s attack on the misuse of casuistry. In ''[[Provincial Letters]]'' (1656–7)<ref>[http://books.google.com/books?id=cmlRK2ynRpoC&dq=pascal+%22provincial+letters%22&psp=1 Blaise Pascal, ''The Provincial Letters of Blaise Pascal,'' tr. Thomas M'Crie, London Chatto & Windus (1898)]</ref>, he scolded the Jesuits for using casuistic reasoning in confession to placate wealthy Church donors, whilst punishing poor penitents. Pascal charged that aristocratic penitents could confess their sins one day, re-commit the sin the next day, generously donate the following day, then return to re-confess their sins and only receive the lightest punishment; Pascal's criticisms darkened casuistry's reputation. Since the seventeenth century, casuistry has been widely considered a degenerate form of reasoning. Critics of casuistry focus on its specious argumentation as intentionally misleading.
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It was not until publication of ''The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning'' (1988), by Albert Jonsen and [[Stephen Toulmin]]<ref>Albert Jonsen and [[Stephen Toulmin]], ''The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning,'' Berkeley, U. California Press (1990, ISBN 0-520-06960-9).</ref>, that a revival of casuistry occurred. They argue that the abuse of casuistry is the problem, not casuistry itself. Properly used, casuistry is powerful reasoning. Jonsen and Toulmin offer casuistry in dissolving the contradictory tenets of [[Moral absolutism|absolutism]] and [[relativism]]: “the form of reasoning constitutive of classical casuistry is rhetorical reasoning”<ref>Jonsen, 1991, p. 297.</ref>. Moreover, [[Utilitarianism]] and [[Pragmatism]] commonly are identified as philosophies employing the [[rhetoric]]al reasoning of casuistry.
   
 
==Meanings ==
 
==Meanings ==
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Casuistry is a method of case reasoning especially useful in treating cases that involve moral dilemmas.
 
Casuistry is a branch of [[applied ethics]].
 
Casuistry is a branch of [[applied ethics]].
 
Casuistry is the basis of [[case law]] in [[common law]].
 
Casuistry is the basis of [[case law]] in [[common law]].
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== The casuist morality ==
 
== The casuist morality ==
Casuistry takes a relentlessly practical approach to morality. Rather than applying theories, it examines cases. By drawing parallels between [[paradigm]]s, so called "pure cases," and the case at hand, a casuist tries to determine the correct response (not merely an evaluation) to a particular case. The selection of a paradigm case is justified by warrants.
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Casuistry takes a relentlessly practical approach to morality. Rather than using theories as starting points, casuistry begins with an examination of cases. By drawing parallels between [[paradigm]]s, so called "pure cases," and the case at hand, a casuist tries to determine a moral response appropriate to a particular case.
   
 
Casuistry has been described as "theory modest" (Arras, see below). One of the strengths of casuistry is that it does not begin with, nor does it overemphasize, theoretical issues. Casuistry does not require practitioners to agree about ethical theories or evaluations before making policy. Instead, they can agree that certain [[paradigm]]s should be treated in certain ways, and then agree on the similarities, the so-called warrants between a paradigm and the case at hand.
A particular strength of casuistry is its flexibility. When a legal fact (or "legal fiction") does not correspond to reality, the mere existence of that legal fact does not impede a rational casuistic response. For example, casuistic reasoning would easily accept that illegally obtained evidence should still be admitted to a legal argument because the illegality of the methods used to obtain the evidence does not negate the value of the evidence itself. The illegal methods themselves should be prosecuted, but that is a separate issue. In contrast, a rigorous theoretical approach might find that such evidence is "not real evidence," and therefore refuse to admit it to permissible reasoning.
 
   
 
Since most people, and most cultures, substantially agree about most pure ethical situations, casuistry often creates ethical arguments that can persuade people of different ethnic, religious and philosophical beliefs to treat particular cases in the same ways. For this reason, casuistry is widely considered to be the basis for the [[English law|English]] [[common law]] and its derivatives.
Casuistry is successful because it does not require participants in the evaluation to agree about ethical theories or evaluations before making policy. Instead, they can agree that certain [[paradigm]]s should be treated in certain ways, and then agree on the similarities, the so-called warrants between a paradigm and the case at hand.
 
   
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Casuistry is prone to abuses wherever the analogies between cases are false.
Since most people, and most cultures, substantially agree about most pure ethical situations, casuistry often creates ethical arguments that can persuade people of different ethnic, religious and philosophical beliefs to treat particular cases in the same ways. For this reason, casuistry is the form of reasoning used in [[English law]].
 
 
Casuistry is prone to abuses wherever the analogies between cases are false. Often late medieval reasoning applied false analogies in casuistry, through allegorical interpretations, a mode of illogic that found support in the elaborate parallels deduced by Christians between Old Testament Law and New Testament events.
 
   
 
== Casuistry in early modern times ==
 
== Casuistry in early modern times ==
The casuistic method was popular among [[Jewish law|Rabbinic scholars]] and [[Catholicism|Catholic]] thinkers in the early modern period, especially the [[Jesuits]]. It was encouraged by the Catholic practice of [[confession]] of sins to priests, which created a demand for manuals for confessors with detailed advice on cases of [[conscience]]. Casuistry was much mistrusted by early [[Reformation|Protestant theologians]], because it justified many of the abuses that they sought to reform. It was famously attacked by [[Blaise Pascal|Pascal]] in his [[Lettres provinciales|Provincial Letters]] as the use of overly complex reasoning to justify moral laxity; hence the everyday use of the term to mean complex reasoning to justify moral laxity. Pascal defended the [[Jansenist]] [[Port-Royal Logic]] against the Jesuits' casuistry and their legitimation of [[power (sociology)|power]] (the Jesuit order had substituted itself to the [[Dominican Order|Dominicans]] as the dominant order, and enjoyed a strong influence in Europe's royal courts).
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The casuistic method was popular among [[Roman Catholicism|Catholic]] thinkers in the early modern period, and not only among the [[Jesuits]], as it is commonly thought. Famous casuistic authors include [[Antonio Escobar y Mendoza]]'s ''Summula casuum conscientiae'' (1627), which had enjoyed a great success, [[Thomas Sanchez]], [[Vincenzo Filliucci]] (Jesuit and [[Apostolic Penitentiary|penitentiary]] at [[St Peter]]'s), [[Antonino Diana]], [[Paul Laymann]] (''Theologia Moralis'', 1625), [[John Azor]] (''Institutiones Morales'', 1600), [[Etienne Bauny]], [[Louis Cellot]], [[Valerius Reginaldus]], [[Hermann Busembaum]] (d. 1668), etc. One of the main theses of casuists was the necessity to adapt the rigorous morals of the [[Church Fathers|Early Fathers]] of [[Christianity]] to modern morals, which led in some extreme cases to justify what [[Innocent XI]] later called "laxist moral" (i.e. justification of [[usury]], [[homicide]], [[regicide]], [[lie|lying]] through "[[Doctrine of mental reservation|mental reservation]]", [[Catholic teachings on sexual morality|adultery and loss of virginity before marriage]], etc. &mdash; all due cases registered by [[Blaise Pascal|Pascal]] in the ''[[Provincial Letters]]'').
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The progress of casuistry was interrupted towards the middle of the 17th century by the controversy which arose concerning the [[Catholic probabilism|doctrine of probabilism]], which stipulated that one could choose to follow a "probable opinion," that is, supported by a theologian or another, even if it contradicted a more probable opinion or a quotation from one of the [[Founding Fathers]].{{Fact|date=January 2008}} The controversy divided Catholic theologians into two camps, Rigorists and Laxists.
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Casuistry was much mistrusted by early [[Reformation|Protestant theologians]], because it justified many of the abuses that they sought to reform. It was famously attacked by the Catholic and [[Jansenist]] philosopher [[Blaise Pascal|Pascal]], during the [[formulary controversy]] against the Jesuits, in his [[Lettres provinciales|Provincial Letters]] as the use of [[rhetorics]] to justify moral laxity, which became identified by the public with [[Jesuitism]]; hence the everyday use of the term to mean complex and [[sophist|sophistic]] reasoning to justify moral laxity. By the middle of the 18th century, the name of "casuistry" became a synonym of moral laxity.{{Fact|date=January 2008}}
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In 1679 [[Pope Innocent XI]] publicly condemned sixty-five of the more radical propositions (''stricti mentalis''), taken chiefly from the writings of Escobar, [[Francisco Suarez|Suarez]] and other casuists as ''propositiones laxorum moralistarum'' and forbade anyone to teach them under penalty of [[excommunication]]<ref> Kelly, J.N.D., The Oxford History of the Popes, Oxford University Press, 1986. ISBN 0192820850 (p.287) </ref>. Despite this papal condemnation, both Catholicism and Protestantism permits the use of ambiguous and equivocal statements in specific circumstances <ref> J.-P. Cavaillé, ''[http://dossiersgrihl.revues.org/document281.html Ruser sans mentir, de la casuistique aux sciences sociales : le recours à l’équivocité, entre efficacité pragmatique et souci éthique]'', in [[Serge Latouche]], P.-J. Laurent, O. Servais & M. Singleton, ''Les Raisons de la ruse. Une perspective anthropologique et psychanalytique'', Actes du colloque international « La raison rusée », Louvain la Neuve, mars 2001, Paris, La Découverte, 2004, pp. 93–118 {{fr icon}}.</ref>.
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[[Alphonsus Maria de Liguori]] (d. 1787), founder of the [[Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer]], then brought some attention back to casuistry by publishing again Hermann Busembaum's ''Medulla Theologiae Moralis'', the last edition of it being published in 1785 and receiving the approbation of the [[Holy See]] in 1803.{{Fact|date=January 2008}} Busembaum's ''Medulla'' had been burnt in Toulouse in 1757 because of its justification of [[regicide]], deemed particularly scandalous after [[Robert-François Damiens|Damiens]]' assassination attempt against [[Louis XV]].{{Fact|date=January 2008}}
   
 
== Criticism ==
 
== Criticism ==
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{{Unreferencedsection|date=January 2008}}
Casuists have often been mistrusted as too self-serving, and their reasoning thought too inaccessible. The reasoning is often inaccessible because successful casuistry requires a large amount of knowledge about paradigms, and how parallels can be drawn from those paradigms to real life situations. In modern times, there is a similar tremendous resentment against lawyers and law.
 
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{{criticism-section}}
 
Casuists have often been mistrusted as too self-serving, and their reasoning thought too inaccessible. The reasoning is often inaccessible because successful casuistry requires a large amount of knowledge about paradigms, and how parallels can be drawn from those paradigms to real life situations. In modern times, there is a similar tremendous resentment against lawyers and law. Defenders of casuistry often point out that the problems are not so much with casuistry itself, but with the improper use of casuistry. That these problems manifest themselves so often however may make it appear to some that this form of reasoning is somewhat easier to misuse than it is to apply correctly.
   
 
== Casuistry in modern times ==
 
== Casuistry in modern times ==
In modern times, casuistry has successfully been applied to [[law]], [[bioethics]] and [[business ethics]], and its reputation is somewhat rehabilitated. [[G.E. Moore]] dealed in chapter 1.4 of his [[Principia Ethica]] with casuistry; he claimed that "the defects of casuistry are not defects of principle; no objection can be taken to its aim and object. It has failed only because it is far too difficult a subject to be treated adequately in our present state of knowledge."
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In modern times, casuistry has successfully been applied to [[law]], [[bioethics]] and [[business ethics]], and its reputation is somewhat rehabilitated. [[G.E. Moore]] dealt with casuistry in chapter 1.4 of his ''[[Principia Ethica]]''; he claimed that "the defects of casuistry are not defects of principle; no objection can be taken to its aim and object. It has failed only because it is far too difficult a subject to be treated adequately in our present state of knowledge." He also asserted, "Casuistry is the goal of ethical investigation. It cannot be safely attempted at the beginning of our studies, but only at the end."<ref>[http://books.google.com/books?id=ZLpcgAQvr_gC&pg=PA57&lpg=PA57&dq=%22the+defects+of+casuistry+are+not+defects+of+principle+no+objection+can+be+taken+to+its+aim+and+object+it+has+failed+only+because+it+is+far+too+difficult+a+subject+to%22&source=web&ots=31d6_MoIZ3&sig=pqA0H1IkL7FXgnnRo5Caq-_EWTA G. E. Moore, ''Principia Ethica,'' (1903); 2nd ed. Thomas Baldwin, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge U. Press (1993), p. 57. ISBN 0521448484]</ref>
   
A good reference, analysing the methodological structure of casuistic argument is ''The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning'' (1990), by Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin (ISBN 0520069609).
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A good reference, analysing the methodological structure of casuistic argument is ''The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning'' (1990), by Albert Jonsen and [[Stephen Toulmin]] (ISBN 0-520-06960-9).
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==References==
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{{reflist}}
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*Peabody, A. P. (1873). Casuistry. New York, NY: American Book Company.
   
 
==External links==
 
==External links==
*[http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-35 ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas'':] Casuistry
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* [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-35 ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas'':] Casuistry
 
*[http://www.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/accountancy.html Accountancy as computational casuistics], article on how modern compliance regimes in accountancy and law apply casuistry
 
*[http://www.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/accountancy.html Accountancy as computational casuistics], article on how modern compliance regimes in accountancy and law apply casuistry
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*[http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03415d.htm Casuistry - Catholic Encyclopedia]
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*[http://www.thegreatideas.org/apd-casu.html Mortimer Adler's Great Ideas - Casuistry]
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*[http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/C/CA/CASUISTRY.htm 1911 Encyclopedia]
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*[http://www.jeramyt.org/papers/casuistry.html Summary of casuistry by Jeramy Townsley]
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*[http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/80130/part2/casuistry/Casuistry.html Casuistry - Online Guide to Ethics and Moral Philosophy]
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*[http://www.she-philosopher.com/library/tallmon.html Casuistry - Oxford Encyclopedia of Rhetoric] catalogued at she-philosopher.com
   
 
== See also ==
 
== See also ==
 
* [[Qiyas]]
 
* [[Qiyas]]
 
* [[Blue Laws]]
 
* [[Blue Laws]]
*[[School of Salamanca]]
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* [[School of Salamanca]]
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* [[Case-based reasoning]]
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*[[Dispensation (Catholic Church)]]
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* [[Applied ethics]]
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* [[Rhetoric]]
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* [[Rhetorical reason]]
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* [[List of thought processes]]
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* [[Situation ethics]]
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[[Category:Catholic casuists|*]]
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[[Category:Scholasticism]]
 
[[Category:Scholasticism]]
[[Category:Ethics]]
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[[Category:Applied ethics]]
 
[[Category:Common law]]
 
[[Category:Common law]]
 
[[Category:Philosophical terminology]]
 
[[Category:Philosophical terminology]]
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[[Category:thought]]
   
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Casuistry (pronounced /ˈkæʒuːɨstri/) is an applied ethics term referring to case-based reasoning. Casuistry is used in juridical and ethical discussions of law and ethics, and often is a critique of principle-based reasoning[1].

For example, while a principle-based approach might claim that lying is always morally wrong, the casuist would argue that, depending upon the details of the case, lying might or might not be illegal or unethical. For instance, the casuist might conclude that a person is wrong to lie in legal testimony under oath, but might argue that lying actually is the best moral choice if the lie saves a life (Thomas Sanchez and others thus theorized a doctrine of mental reservation). For the casuist, the circumstances of a case are essential for evaluating the proper response.

Typically, casuistic reasoning begins with a clear-cut paradigmatic case (from paradigm, the Greek word παράδειγμα, paradeigma, "pattern" and "example", in turn derived from παραδεικνύναι paradeiknunai, "demonstrate"). In legal reasoning, for example, this might be a precedent case, such as pre-meditated murder. From it, the casuist would ask how closely the given case currently under consideration matches the paradigmatic case. Cases like the paradigmatic case ought to be treated like-wise; cases unlike the paradigm ought to be treated differently. Thus, a man is properly charged with pre-meditated murder if the circumstances surrounding his case closely resemble the exemplar pre-meditated murder case. The less a given case is like the paradigm, the weaker the justification is for treating that case like the paradigmatic case.

Western casuistry dates from Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), yet the zenith of casuistry was from A.D. 1550 to A.D. 1650, when the Jesuit religious order extensively used casuistry, particularly in practicing the private, Roman Catholic confessional. The term casuistry quickly became pejorative with Blaise Pascal's attack on the misuse of casuistry. In Provincial Letters (1656–7)[2], he scolded the Jesuits for using casuistic reasoning in confession to placate wealthy Church donors, whilst punishing poor penitents. Pascal charged that aristocratic penitents could confess their sins one day, re-commit the sin the next day, generously donate the following day, then return to re-confess their sins and only receive the lightest punishment; Pascal's criticisms darkened casuistry's reputation. Since the seventeenth century, casuistry has been widely considered a degenerate form of reasoning. Critics of casuistry focus on its specious argumentation as intentionally misleading.

It was not until publication of The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (1988), by Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin[3], that a revival of casuistry occurred. They argue that the abuse of casuistry is the problem, not casuistry itself. Properly used, casuistry is powerful reasoning. Jonsen and Toulmin offer casuistry in dissolving the contradictory tenets of absolutism and relativism: “the form of reasoning constitutive of classical casuistry is rhetorical reasoning”[4]. Moreover, Utilitarianism and Pragmatism commonly are identified as philosophies employing the rhetorical reasoning of casuistry.

Meanings

Casuistry is a method of case reasoning especially useful in treating cases that involve moral dilemmas. Casuistry is a branch of applied ethics. Casuistry is the basis of case law in common law. It is the standard form of reasoning applied in common law.

The casuist morality

Casuistry takes a relentlessly practical approach to morality. Rather than using theories as starting points, casuistry begins with an examination of cases. By drawing parallels between paradigms, so called "pure cases," and the case at hand, a casuist tries to determine a moral response appropriate to a particular case.

Casuistry has been described as "theory modest" (Arras, see below). One of the strengths of casuistry is that it does not begin with, nor does it overemphasize, theoretical issues. Casuistry does not require practitioners to agree about ethical theories or evaluations before making policy. Instead, they can agree that certain paradigms should be treated in certain ways, and then agree on the similarities, the so-called warrants between a paradigm and the case at hand.

Since most people, and most cultures, substantially agree about most pure ethical situations, casuistry often creates ethical arguments that can persuade people of different ethnic, religious and philosophical beliefs to treat particular cases in the same ways. For this reason, casuistry is widely considered to be the basis for the English common law and its derivatives.

Casuistry is prone to abuses wherever the analogies between cases are false.

Casuistry in early modern times

The casuistic method was popular among Catholic thinkers in the early modern period, and not only among the Jesuits, as it is commonly thought. Famous casuistic authors include Antonio Escobar y Mendoza's Summula casuum conscientiae (1627), which had enjoyed a great success, Thomas Sanchez, Vincenzo Filliucci (Jesuit and penitentiary at St Peter's), Antonino Diana, Paul Laymann (Theologia Moralis, 1625), John Azor (Institutiones Morales, 1600), Etienne Bauny, Louis Cellot, Valerius Reginaldus, Hermann Busembaum (d. 1668), etc. One of the main theses of casuists was the necessity to adapt the rigorous morals of the Early Fathers of Christianity to modern morals, which led in some extreme cases to justify what Innocent XI later called "laxist moral" (i.e. justification of usury, homicide, regicide, lying through "mental reservation", adultery and loss of virginity before marriage, etc. — all due cases registered by Pascal in the Provincial Letters).

The progress of casuistry was interrupted towards the middle of the 17th century by the controversy which arose concerning the doctrine of probabilism, which stipulated that one could choose to follow a "probable opinion," that is, supported by a theologian or another, even if it contradicted a more probable opinion or a quotation from one of the Founding Fathers.[How to reference and link to summary or text] The controversy divided Catholic theologians into two camps, Rigorists and Laxists.

Casuistry was much mistrusted by early Protestant theologians, because it justified many of the abuses that they sought to reform. It was famously attacked by the Catholic and Jansenist philosopher Pascal, during the formulary controversy against the Jesuits, in his Provincial Letters as the use of rhetorics to justify moral laxity, which became identified by the public with Jesuitism; hence the everyday use of the term to mean complex and sophistic reasoning to justify moral laxity. By the middle of the 18th century, the name of "casuistry" became a synonym of moral laxity.[How to reference and link to summary or text]

In 1679 Pope Innocent XI publicly condemned sixty-five of the more radical propositions (stricti mentalis), taken chiefly from the writings of Escobar, Suarez and other casuists as propositiones laxorum moralistarum and forbade anyone to teach them under penalty of excommunication[5]. Despite this papal condemnation, both Catholicism and Protestantism permits the use of ambiguous and equivocal statements in specific circumstances [6].

Alphonsus Maria de Liguori (d. 1787), founder of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, then brought some attention back to casuistry by publishing again Hermann Busembaum's Medulla Theologiae Moralis, the last edition of it being published in 1785 and receiving the approbation of the Holy See in 1803.[How to reference and link to summary or text] Busembaum's Medulla had been burnt in Toulouse in 1757 because of its justification of regicide, deemed particularly scandalous after Damiens' assassination attempt against Louis XV.[How to reference and link to summary or text]

Criticism

Template:Criticism-section Casuists have often been mistrusted as too self-serving, and their reasoning thought too inaccessible. The reasoning is often inaccessible because successful casuistry requires a large amount of knowledge about paradigms, and how parallels can be drawn from those paradigms to real life situations. In modern times, there is a similar tremendous resentment against lawyers and law. Defenders of casuistry often point out that the problems are not so much with casuistry itself, but with the improper use of casuistry. That these problems manifest themselves so often however may make it appear to some that this form of reasoning is somewhat easier to misuse than it is to apply correctly.

Casuistry in modern times

In modern times, casuistry has successfully been applied to law, bioethics and business ethics, and its reputation is somewhat rehabilitated. G.E. Moore dealt with casuistry in chapter 1.4 of his Principia Ethica; he claimed that "the defects of casuistry are not defects of principle; no objection can be taken to its aim and object. It has failed only because it is far too difficult a subject to be treated adequately in our present state of knowledge." He also asserted, "Casuistry is the goal of ethical investigation. It cannot be safely attempted at the beginning of our studies, but only at the end."[7]

A good reference, analysing the methodological structure of casuistic argument is The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (1990), by Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin (ISBN 0-520-06960-9).

References

  1. "Casuistry", Dictionary of the History of Ideas, University of Virginia Library. On line.
  2. Blaise Pascal, The Provincial Letters of Blaise Pascal, tr. Thomas M'Crie, London Chatto & Windus (1898)
  3. Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning, Berkeley, U. California Press (1990, ISBN 0-520-06960-9).
  4. Jonsen, 1991, p. 297.
  5. Kelly, J.N.D., The Oxford History of the Popes, Oxford University Press, 1986. ISBN 0192820850 (p.287)
  6. J.-P. Cavaillé, Ruser sans mentir, de la casuistique aux sciences sociales : le recours à l’équivocité, entre efficacité pragmatique et souci éthique, in Serge Latouche, P.-J. Laurent, O. Servais & M. Singleton, Les Raisons de la ruse. Une perspective anthropologique et psychanalytique, Actes du colloque international « La raison rusée », Louvain la Neuve, mars 2001, Paris, La Découverte, 2004, pp. 93–118 (French) .
  7. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, (1903); 2nd ed. Thomas Baldwin, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge U. Press (1993), p. 57. ISBN 0521448484
  • Peabody, A. P. (1873). Casuistry. New York, NY: American Book Company.

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See also

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