# Argument

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This article discusses logical argument. For the interpersonal conflict see Arguments

In logic, an **argument** is a set of one or more meaningful declarative sentences (or "propositions") known as the premises along with another meaningful declarative sentence (or "proposition") known as the conclusion. A deductive argument asserts that the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises; an inductive argument asserts that the truth of the conclusion is supported by the premises. Deductive arguments are valid or invalid, and sound or not sound. An argument is valid if and only if the truth of the conclusion **is** a logical consequence of the premises and (consequently) its corresponding conditional is a necessary truth. A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises.

Each premise and the conclusion are only either true or false, i.e. are truth bearers. The sentences composing an argument are referred to as being either *true* or *false*, not as being *valid* or *invalid*; deductive arguments are referred to as being *valid* or *invalid*, not as being *true* or *false*.
Some authors refer to the premises and conclusion using the terms *declarative sentence*, *statement*, *proposition*, *sentence*, or even *indicative utterance*. The reason for the variety is concern about the ontological significance of the terms, *proposition* in particular. Whichever term is used, each premise and the conclusion must be capable of being true or false and nothing else: they are truthbearers.

## Contents

[show]## Formal and informal arguments

*Further information: informal logic and formal logic*

Informal arguments are studied in *informal logic*, are presented in ordinary language and are intended for everyday discourse. Conversely, formal arguments are studied in *formal logic* (historically called *symbolic logic*, more commonly referred to as *mathematical logic* today) and are expressed in a formal language. Informal logic may be said to emphasize the study of argumentation, whereas formal logic emphasizes implication and inference. Informal arguments are sometimes implicit. That is, the logical structure – the relationship of claims, premises, warrants, relations of implication, and conclusion – is not always spelled out and immediately visible and must sometimes be made explicit by analysis.

## Deductive arguments

*Main article: Deductive argument*

A *deductive argument* is one which, if valid, has a conclusion that is entailed by its premises. In other words, the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises--if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. It would be self-contradictory to assert the premises and deny the conclusion, because the negation of the conclusion is contradictory to the truth of the premises.

### Validity

*Main article: Validity*

Arguments may be either valid or invalid. If an argument is valid, and its premises are true, the conclusion must be true: a valid argument cannot have true premises and a false conclusion.

The validity of an argument depends, however, not on the actual truth or falsity of its premises and conclusions, but solely on whether or not the argument has a valid logical form. The validity of an argument is not a guarantee of the truth of its conclusion. A valid argument may have false premises and a false conclusion.

Logic seeks to discover the valid forms, the forms that make arguments valid arguments. An argument form is valid if and only if all arguments of that form are valid. Since the validity of an argument depends on its form, an argument can be shown to be invalid by showing that its form is invalid, and this can be done by giving another argument of the same form that has true premises but a false conclusion. In informal logic this is called a counter argument.

The form of argument can be shown by the use of symbols. For each argument form, there is a corresponding statement form, called a corresponding conditional, and an argument form is valid if and only its corresponding conditional is a logical truth. A statement form which is logically true is also said to be a valid statement form. A statement form is a logical truth if it is true under all interpretations. A statement form can be shown to be a logical truth by either (a) showing that it is a tautology or (b) by means of a proof procedure.

The *corresponding conditional*, of a valid argument is a necessary truth (true *in all possible worlds*) and so we might say that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or follows of logical necessity. The conclusion of a valid argument is not necessarily true, it depends on whether the premises are true. The conclusion of a valid argument need not be a necessary truth: if it were so, it would be so independently of the premises.

For example:

*Some Greeks are logicians; therefore, some logicians are Greeks.*Valid argument; it would be self-contradictory to admit that*some Greeks are logicians*but deny that*some (any) logicians are Greeks*.

*All Greeks are human and all humans are mortal; therefore, all Greeks are mortal.*: Valid argument; if the premises are true the conclusion must be true.

*Some Greeks are logicians and some logicians are tiresome; therefore, some Greeks are tiresome.*Invalid argument: the tiresome logicians might all be Romans (for example).

*Either we are all doomed or we are all saved; we are not all saved; therefore, we are all doomed.*Valid argument; the premises entail the conclusion. (Remember that this does not mean the conclusion has to be true; it is only true if the premises are true, which they may not be!)

Arguments can be invalid for a variety of reasons. There are well-established patterns of reasoning that render arguments that follow them invalid; these patterns are known as logical fallacies.

### Soundness

*Main article: Soundness*

A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises. A sound argument, being both valid and having true premises, must have a true conclusion. Some authors (especially in earlier literature) use the term *sound* as synonymous with *valid*.

## Inductive arguments

*Main article: Inductive argument*

Inductive logic is reasoning using arguments in which the premises support the conclusion but do not entail it. Induction is a form of reasoning that makes generalizations based on individual instances. An inductive argument is said to be *cogent* if and only if the truth of the argument's premises would render the truth of the conclusion probable (i.e., the argument is *strong*), and the argument's premises are, in fact, true. Cogency can be considered inductive logic's analogue to deductive logic's "soundness." Despite its name, mathematical induction is not a form of inductive reasoning. The problem of induction is the philosophical question of whether inductive reasoning is valid.

## Defeasible arguments

An argument is defeasible when additional information (such as new counterreasons) can have the effect that it no longer justifies its conclusion. The term "defeasibility" goes back to the legal theorist H.L.A. Hart, although he focused on concepts instead of arguments. Stephen Toulmin's influential argument model includes the possibility of counterreasons that is characteristic of defeasible arguments, but he did not discuss the evaluation of defeasible arguments. Defeasible arguments give rise to defeasible reasoning.

## Argument by analogy

Argument by analogy may be thought of as argument from the particular to particular.^{[1]} An argument by analogy may use a particular truth in a premise to argue towards a similar particular truth in the conclusion.^{[1]} For example, if A. Plato was mortal, and B. Plato was just like Socrates, then asserting that C. Socrates was mortal is an example of argument by analogy because the reasoning employed in it proceeds from a particular truth in a premise (Plato was mortal) to a similar particular truth in the conclusion, namely that Socrates was mortal.^{[2]}

## Fallacies and non arguments

*Main article: Logical fallacy*

A fallacy is an invalid argument that appears valid, or a valid argument with disguised assumptions. First the premises and the conclusion must be statements, capable of being true and false. Secondly it must be asserted that the conclusion follows from the premises. In English the words *therefore*, *so*, *because* and *hence* typically separate the premises from the conclusion of an argument, but this is not necessarily so. Thus: *Socrates is a man, all men are mortal therefore Socrates is mortal* is clearly an argument (a valid one at that), because it is clear it is asserted that that *Socrates is mortal* follows from the preceding statements. However *I was thirsty and therefore I drank* is NOT an argument, despite its appearance. It is not being claimed that *I drank* is logically entailed by *I was thirsty*. The *therefore* in this sentence indicates *for that reason* not *it follows that*.

- Elliptical arguments

Often an argument is invalid because there is a missing premise the supply of which would make it valid. Speakers and writers will often leave out a strictly necessary premise in their reasonings if it is widely accepted and the writer does not wish to state the blindingly obvious. Example: *Iron is a metal therefore it will expand when heated.* (Missing premise: all metals expand when heated). On the other hand a seemingly valid argument may be found to lack a premise – a ‘hidden assumption’ – which if highlighted can show a fault in reasoning. Example: A witness reasoned: *Nobody came out the front door except the milkman therefore the murderer must have left by the back door.* (Hidden assumption- the milkman was not the murderer).

## Notes

## References

- Shaw, Warren Choate (1922).
*The Art of Debate*, Allyn and Bacon. URL accessed 4 December 2008. - Robert Audi,
*Epistemology*, Routledge, 1998. Particularly relevant is Chapter 6, which explores the relationship between knowledge, inference and argument. - J. L. Austin
*How to Do Things With Words*, Oxford University Press, 1976. - H. P. Grice,
*Logic and Conversation*in*The Logic of Grammar*, Dickenson, 1975. - Vincent F. Hendricks,
*Thought 2 Talk: A Crash Course in Reflection and Expression*, New York: Automatic Press / VIP, 2005, ISBN 87-991013-7-8 - R. A. DeMillo, R. J. Lipton and A. J. Perlis,
*Social Processes and Proofs of Theorems and Programs*, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 22, No. 5, 1979. A classic article on the social process of acceptance of proofs in mathematics. - Yu. Manin,
*A Course in Mathematical Logic*, Springer Verlag, 1977. A mathematical view of logic. This book is different from most books on mathematical logic in that it emphasizes the mathematics of logic, as opposed to the formal structure of logic. - Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca,
*The New Rhetoric*, Notre Dame, 1970. This classic was originally published in French in 1958. - Henri Poincaré,
*Science and Hypothesis*, Dover Publications, 1952 - Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst,
*Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions*, Foris Publications, 1984. - K. R. Popper
*Objective Knowledge; An Evolutionary Approach*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. - L. S. Stebbing,
*A Modern Introduction to Logic*, Methuen and Co., 1948. An account of logic that covers the classic topics of logic and argument while carefully considering modern developments in logic. - Douglas Walton,
*Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation*, Cambridge, 1998 - Carlos Chesñevar, Ana Maguitman and Ronald Loui,
*Logical Models of Argument*, ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 32, num. 4, pp.337-383, 2000. - T. Edward Damer. Attacking Faulty Reasoning, 5th Edition, Wadsworth, 2005. ISBN 0-534-60516-8
- Charles Arthur Willard, A Theory of Argumentation. 1989.
- Charles Arthur Willard, Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge. 1982.

## Further reading

- Salmon, Wesley C.
*Logic*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall (1963). Library of Congress Catalog Card no. 63-10528. - Aristotle,
*Prior and Posterior Analytics*. Ed. and trans. John Warrington. London: Dent (1964) - Mates, Benson.
*Elementary Logic*. New York: OUP (1972). Library of Congress Catalog Card no. 74-166004. - Mendelson, Elliot.
*Introduction to Mathematical Logic*. New York: Van Nostran Reinholds Company (1964). - Frege, Gottlob.
*The Foundations of Arithmetic*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press (1980).

## See also

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## External links

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